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I. NONCITIZENS IN THE U.S. MILITARY 
We are the Romans of the modern world, the great assimilating 
people.1 
A. BACKGROUND 
Throughout the history of the United States, immigrants have formed the 
bedrock upon which the nation was built.  Their thirst for opportunity and 
willingness to sacrifice has shaped U.S. society in lasting and important ways.  
From the start, citizenship has been a reward for immigrants’ persistence and 
contributions.  The concept of citizenship for military service is deeply rooted in 
American tradition.2  Over the years, the nation’s need for military manpower has 
provided an opportunity for immigrants to achieve the legitimacy and benefits 
associated with citizenship.  Since 1862, Congressional legislation has provided 
for the naturalization of more than 660,000 military veterans.3 
Immigration history and policy have shaped the course of the United 
States, an “immigrant nation” from the start, and affected military personnel 
policy in a significant way.  To gain an appreciation of the interconnected nature 
of immigration and military service, it is helpful to understand the dialectical 
process between history and policy and its corresponding effect on noncitizens 
who serve. 
One may gain a deeper understanding of the individuals who currently 
serve as noncitizen enlistees by exploring their histories and motivations in the 
context of a broader canvas.  Many of these personal histories are tied directly to 
U.S. policy.  The combination of personal and global perspectives paints a more 
expansive picture of the U.S. military and the nation. 
                                            
1 Oliver Wendell Holmes quoted in John Higham, Strangers in the Land (New York:  
Atheneum, 1963), 21.  
2 James B. Jacobs, and Leslie Anne Hayes, “Aliens in the U.S. Armed Forces,” Armed 
Forces and Society 7, no. 2 (1981): 188. 
3 Darlene C. Goring, “In Service to America:  Naturalization of Undocumented Alien 
Veterans,” Seton Hall Law Review, 31 (2000): 402. 
1 
To determine objectively the success of noncitizen enlistees, one may 
statistically analyze their performance relative to citizen enlistees.  Three 
traditional measures of early success used in military manpower studies are first-
term attrition, retention beyond the first-term, and promotion to E-4.  Statistical 
models to predict success in these three areas provide an empirical basis on 
which to assess noncitizen enlistees’ performance the first several years of their 
enlistments.      
B. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this research is to provide a better understanding of an 
important minority group in the military, and one that military scholars have 
studied very little.  This thesis examines the historical aspect of immigrant military 
service, and explores the motivations of noncitizen enlistees.  It also presents an 
analysis of noncitizens’ military success relative to citizen enlistees.  The results 
presented here may have valuable implications for recruiting and retention of this 
population. 
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
Chapter II provides a comparison of immigration and naturalization policy 
with the history of noncitizens in the military since the nation’s founding.  Chapter 
III discusses noncitizens’ motivations to enlist, and includes the impressions 
gained from interviews with ten individuals who enlisted as noncitizens.  Chapter 
IV presents statistical analyses of the predicted success of noncitizen enlistees.  
Measures of success are analyzed for the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine 
Corps, with results presented for each service.  Finally, Chapter V provides a 
summary of the results of the study, conclusions, and recommendations for 
policy makers and researchers. 
2 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW:  IMMIGRATION AND 
NATURALIZATION POLICY AND THE MILITARY SERVICE OF 
NONCITIZENS 
A. ERAS OF IMMIGRATION 
Four major eras of immigration can be identified in U.S. history.4  The first, 
the pre-industrial era, began before the birth of the country and continued until 
1820.  During this time, immigration consisted mainly of African slaves and 
Northern Europeans traveling to the New World.  The European immigrants were 
drawn by enormous economic opportunity, including the possibility of domestic 
migration westward.5  Since the states and the federal government did not begin 
tracking immigration until the 1820s, an accurate count of the total number of 
immigrant arrivals is not available.  Nevertheless, it is estimated that one-million 
immigrants traveled to the United States during the period 1790-1845.6  Foreign-
born individuals are believed to have comprised about 13 percent of the 
population in 1790, and a little over 10 percent by 1820.7 
The second era, from 1840-1860, was the First Great Wave of industrial- 
era migration.8  An estimated 4,311,465 individuals9 immigrated from Africa and 
from Northern and Western European countries.  Political turmoil and poor 
harvests were the driving force behind the European exodus.  This “push” factor, 
coupled with the “pull” of economic opportunity in America, resulted in a flood of 
migration.   
 
                                            
4 Louis DeSipio, and Rodolfo O. de la Garza, Making Americans, Remaking America, 
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998), 16-17. 
5 Ibid., 29. 
6 Ernest Rubin, “United States,” in Economics of International Migration, ed. by Brinley 
Thomas (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1958), 133. 
7 Ibid., 136. 
8 DeSipio and de la Garza, Making Americans, Remaking America, 29. 




The third era, or Second Great Wave of industrial-era migration, occurred 
in the years 1870-1920.  An estimated 26,277,565 people immigrated to the 
United States,10 with large numbers of “new” immigrants coming from Southern 
and Eastern Europe during the period 1890-1920.  The migration of Asians and 
Latin Americans was also notable.   
The fourth and final era of immigration began in 1965 and continues to the 
present.  During this era of post-industrial migration, it is believed that over 
twenty-five million11 legal immigrants have traveled to the United States thus far.  
Countless more undocumented immigrants have entered the U.S. during this 
time, with up to 300,000 emigrating from other countries each year.12  An 
estimated nine million undocumented immigrants were living in the United States 
as of March 2002.13  
The timeframes not included in the four eras of immigration are the years 
of the Civil War and its aftermath, the years between the two World Wars of the 
twentieth century, and the period that begins in 1941 and continues through the 
first half of the Cold War era.  The discussion of immigration policy that follows 
looks at the history of immigration in these periods. 
B. PERIODS OF IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION POLICY 
Immigration and naturalization policy may be viewed along a continuum 
that begins with the years 1787-1874.  This period encompasses the first and 
second eras of immigration, and is marked by relatively little state or federal 
regulation of the immigration process.  The periods 1875-1918 and 1919-1964 
are marked by the increasing prominence of the federal government in 
formulating policy.  National-origin quotas based on census data14 are the 
hallmark of the 1919-1964 period.  The contemporary period began in 1965 and 
                                            
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 DeSipio and de la Garza, Making Americans, Remaking America, 53.  
13 The Urban Institute, 
http://www.urban.org/Template.cfm?NavMenuID=24&template=/TaggedContent/ViewPublication.
cfm&PublicationID=8685, accessed January 2004. 
14 Census data from 1890 and 1910 formed the basis for these quotas. 
4 
continues to the present day.  The policy implemented in these years is notable 
for its elimination of the national-origin quota system, its promotion of family 
reunification, and for the increase in illegal immigration since the 1970s.   
The following sections present a review of immigration and naturalization 
policy in each of these three periods, followed by the corresponding history of 
noncitizen military service during these years.  Underlying this review is the 
critical linkage between policy and history that influences present-day America. 
1. 1787 - 1874 
a. Immigration and Naturalization Policy  
Prior to 1875, the United States subscribed to an immigration policy 
that may be best described as neutral, with the exception of the Alien and 
Sedition Acts of 1798.15  While the nation’s borders were unrestricted, the federal 
government’s only role was to process immigrants at ports of arrival.16   
Under Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution, Congress is granted 
the power “to establish a uniform rule of naturalization.”  Upon ratification of the 
Constitution in 1789, United States citizenship was granted to all residents of the 
thirteen original colonies.17  On March 26, 1790, the first naturalization act was 
passed.  Free, white, adult men and women with a minimum of two years of 
residency in the United States were eligible for citizenship.  Local, state and 
federal courts were all granted naturalization authority.18 
In 1798, Federalists passed the Alien and Sedition Acts, fearing 
that immigrant loyalties might propel the United States into the Napoleonic Wars, 
and seeing an opportunity to weaken the opposition Republican party.19  The 
residency requirement for petition of citizenship was increased to five years, and 
                                            
15 Charles B. Keely, U.S. Immigration:  A Policy Analysis (New York: The Population Council, 
1979), 8. 
16 DeSipio and de la Garza, Making Americans, Remaking America, 41. 
17 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 
http://uscis.gov/graphics/aboutus/history/since07.htm, accessed January 2004. 
18 Eilleen Bolger, “Background History of the United States Naturalization Process,” in 
Colorado Archives, http://www.archives.state.co.us/natinfo.htm, accessed January 2004. 
19 DeSipio and de la Garza, Making Americans, Remaking America, 79. 
5 
applicants were required to publicly declare their intent to naturalize three years 
in advance.  All the Acts were repealed or expired after Thomas Jefferson took 
office in 1801.  In 1802, Congress legislated that courts were to register the entry 
of all aliens who arrived in the United States.  For the remainder of the century, 
no major naturalization legislation was passed.   
In 1864, during the height of the Civil War, Congress passed 
legislation to encourage immigration.  The federal government agreed to pay 
immigrants’ transportation costs in exchange for future labor.  The only other 
times since 1868 that Congress has passed legislation encouraging immigration 
were during the First and Second World Wars.20  On July 28, 1868, the concept 
of national citizenship was codified with the passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution.     
b. Military Service of Noncitizens  
As the need for civilian manpower trumped nativist sentiments 
during the first period of immigration policy, the need for military manpower 
likewise influenced the policy of the armed services in these years.  The 
precedent for a linkage between citizenship and military service existed as far 
back as the days of the Roman Republic.21  During the Revolutionary War, the 
Continental Congress granted citizenship to enemy troops who agreed to switch 
sides and fight with the Continental forces,22 and some colonial militias offered 
the reward of state citizenship to noncitizens who joined their ranks.23   
 
                                            
20 Ernest Rubin, “United States,” 137. 
21 Charlotte E. Goodfellow, Roman Citizenship:  A Study of Its Territorial and Numerical 
Expansion from the Earliest Times to the Death of Augustus (Lancaster, Pennsylvania: Lancaster 
Press, 1935), 58.  
22 F. G. Franklin, The Legislative History of Naturalization in the United States (New York:  
Arno Press, 1969), 5. 
23 Cara Wong, “Citizenship for Service:  Substitution, Commutation, and “Green Card 
Troops,”” Paper presented at the University of California, Berkeley, Institute of Governmental 
Studies Conference, “A Nation of Immigrants:  Ethnic Identity and Political Incorporation,” May 2-
3, 2003, 3. 
6 
During the War of 1812, the only immigrants excluded from service 
were those who posed a security risk, including British sailors.24  After the War of 
1812, and through the 1950s, both peacetime and wartime enlistment was legally 
restricted to individuals who were citizens of any state.  In practice, however, 
these laws were ignored.25  By the 1840s, immigrants comprised 47 percent of 
the Army’s enlistees, and fought alongside their citizen counterparts in the 
Mexican-American War.26 
During the Civil War, the majority of immigrant enlistees were of 
German and Irish descent.  In some cases, entire battalions of immigrants were 
recruited from individual U.S. cities or counties.27  In forming its conscription 
policy in 1862, the Confederacy did not distinguish between immigrants who 
declared the intention to become citizens (declarant aliens) and those who did 
not (nondeclarant aliens).  Unless exempted by municipal or international law, all 
white male residents between the ages of thirty-five and forty-five were eligible 
for conscription.28   
In the same year, Secretary of State Steward included 
nondeclarant aliens who had ever exercised the right to vote in America in the 
pool of men eligible for conscription by the Union forces.  In 1863, Congressional 
legislation narrowed the immigrant conscription pool to include only declarant 
aliens.  However, in 1864 the supply of eligible draftees was widened again, to 
include nondeclarants who had ever voted or held public office.29  At the same 
time, immigrants who did not comply with conscription policy risked 
                                            
24 James B. Jacobs, and Leslie Anne Hayes, “Aliens in the U.S. Armed Forces,” 188. 
25 Nancy Gentile Ford, Americans All!  Foreign-Born Soldiers in World War I (College 
Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 2001), 48. 
26 Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1967), 168. 
27 Roma Sachs, “They May Not Have Been American-Born, but They Fought America’s Civil 
War with Fervor Nonetheless,” Military History 10, no. 4 (1993): 20. 
28 Ella Lonn, Foreigners in the Confederacy (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 2002), 386. 
29 James B. Jacobs, and Leslie Anne Hayes, “Aliens in the U.S. Armed Forces,” 192. 
7 
deportation.30  Those who were not eligible for the draft, but enlisted 
nonetheless, were often allowed to choose their regiments.31  They, like their 
citizen counterparts, were eligible for federal, state, and local enlistment 
bounties.32      
In 1864, in response to complaints by European leaders about the 
alleged illegal recruiting methods of the U.S. federal government, Secretary of 
State Seward publicly stated that foreigners received no special incentives to 
enlist, and that enlistments occurred only after immigrants arrived in America.33  
The laws of European countries prohibited the federal government from recruiting 
in Europe, but there was no such prohibition against state governments recruiting 
abroad.  As a result, Northern states solicited European citizens for military 
service, though the Europeans’ employment contracts did not specify they would 
enlist in the Union Army upon arrival.34                
Occasionally, enterprising Union recruiters would forcibly enlist 
foreign residents, sailors, and visitors in America through kidnapping and 
drugging.35  Some Canadian citizens were taken from their homeland against 
their will and forced to enlist.  Others were lured with the promise of civilian work 
at high wages.  Once they arrived, they were told the work they had been 
promised was not available, and coerced into enlisting.36   
In all, approximately 20-25 percent of the 2.5 million enlistees in the 
Union and Confederate militaries were immigrants.37  Since most immigrants 
arrived at Northern ports, it is not surprising that the Union Army had the 
                                            
30 Nancy Gentile Ford, Americans All!  Foreign-Born Soldiers in World War I, 149. 
31 Eugene Converse Murdock, One Million Men:  The Civil War Draft in the North (Westport, 
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1971), 190. 
32 Eugene Converse Murdock, Patriotism Limited 1862-1865 (U.S.A.: The Kent State 
University Press, 1967), 18-19. 
33 Ella Lonn, Foreigners in the Union Army and Navy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1951), 406. 
34 Eugene C. Murdock, One Million Men:  The Civil War Draft in the North, 317-21. 
35 Ella Lonn, Foreigners in the Union Army and Navy, 452-58. 
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preponderance of noncitizen enlistees.  Indeed, roughly 90 percent of all 
noncitizens who served in the Civil War were enrolled in the Union’s military.38  
Only about 5 percent of the 1 million Confederate forces were foreign-born.  By 
comparison, the Confederate states had roughly 13.4 percent of the foreign-born 
population in America.39 
Immigrant veterans of both the North and South, unlike other 
immigrants, were not required to submit “first papers” declaring their intent to 
petition for citizenship, nor were they required to complete five years of residency 
in America before petitioning.40  In keeping with the concept of trading citizenship 
for service, a policy that existed since the birth of the United States, Congress 
passed legislation in 1862 permitting nondeclarant aliens who had served 
honorably and had one year of residence in America to petition for citizenship.  
The Confederacy passed similar legislation for its noncitizen enlistees in 1861.41   
2. 1875 - 1918 
a. Immigration and Naturalization Policy 
In 1876, the Supreme Court ruled that only Congress could 
regulate immigration, in accordance with Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.42  
This ruling ended the practice of immigrants attaining U.S. citizenship through 
state and local courts.  The previous year, Congress passed legislation 
prohibiting the immigration of criminals, prostitutes, and contract labor from 
Asia.43  The main purpose of the anti-contract labor provisions was to make  
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organized recruitment of foreign labor illegal, as the practice undercut the wages, 
working conditions, and organization efforts of U.S. laborers.44  In practice, 
however, the new law did not deter potential immigrants.45   
After the transcontinental railroad was completed in 1862, 
numerous White laborers from the East moved West.  Chinese laborers who had 
worked on the railroad were subsequently imported to the East to replace 
workers who were increasingly dissatisfied with their working conditions.  Eastern 
organized labor unions opposed the arrival of Chinese workers and lobbied for 
legislation prohibiting their employment.  In 1882, largely on the basis of this 
lobbying effort, Congress passed legislation that barred the immigration of 
Chinese laborers, or “coolies,” for ten years.46  In 1885, the anti-contract labor 
legislation was extended to all nationalities, though it was weakly enforced.47  An 
1892 law, the Geary Act, extended the ban on Chinese workers, and resulted in 
a large influx of Japanese immigrants to fill the void of cheap labor.48  By the 
start of the twentieth century, immigrants from Mexico became the substitute of 
choice for Chinese laborers.49             
The wave of “new” immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe 
began in the 1880s, and was followed by increasingly restrictive immigration 
legislation.  In 1891 Congress passed legislation establishing the Bureau of 
Immigration to enforce immigration laws.  Increasingly exclusionary immigration 
laws were passed in 1903, 1907, and 1917.50  The 1907 legislation established 
the federal Bureau of Naturalization, whose purpose was to ensure all applicants 
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met citizenship requirements.51  The law required each immigrant who sought 
naturalization to declare an intention to become a citizen.  An immigrant could 
petition for citizenship two-to-seven years after declaring an intent.  The law also 
established a minimum U.S. residency requirement of five years before 
citizenship could be granted.52   
The 1917 legislation instituted an English literacy requirement for all 
immigrants, and barred the immigration of all Asians,53 with the exception of 
Filipinos.54  To satisfy wartime labor requirements, the law suspended anti-
contract labor laws for workers from neighboring countries, and excluded these 
immigrants from the literacy requirement.  A language proficiency stipulation was 
established primarily to limit immigration from the less-developed countries of 
Southern and Eastern Europe.55       
b. Military Service of Noncitizens 
In reaction to the growing anti-immigrant sentiment of the 1880s 
and early 1890s, Congress passed legislation in 1894 requiring peacetime 
enlistees to read, write, and speak English.  An enlistee was also required to be a 
citizen or to declare his intention to become one.  The declaration provision was 
probably the less prohibitive of these two requirements, as immigrants could 
easily file declarations with any U.S. district court.56   
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Though nondeclarant aliens were restricted from serving during the 
Spanish-American War,57 the need for manpower during World War I led to the 
repeal of this prohibition against nondeclarants.  Only citizens of enemy countries 
were ineligible for enlistment.58  In fact, the Selective Draft Act of 1917 exempted 
declarant aliens from registering for the draft only if they withdrew their 
declarations.  Those who claimed exemption forfeited the opportunity of future 
citizenship.59  Nondeclarant aliens, and aliens from enemy countries who had 
been drafted in error, were granted the right to continue their military service if 
approved by their commanding officers.60   
In all, immigrants from forty-six different nations comprised more 
than 18 percent of Army enlistees.61  This number included over 4,000 Filipinos 
who enlisted in the Army and another 6,000 who enlisted in the Navy.62  In May 
1918, Congress passed legislation affording all immigrant military members who 
had served for at least three years the opportunity to naturalize without proof of 
residence.  In addition, noncitizens who had served during World War I were not 
required to file a declaration of intention.63  Thus, a precedent was established of 
allowing unlawful immigrants to achieve citizenship through military service.  
More than 123,000 military members were naturalized by virtue of their service 
during World War I.64      
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3. 1919 - 1964 
a. Immigration and Naturalization Policy 
After World War I, restrictions on immigration were imposed once 
again.  Two forces led the movement for new restrictions:  so-called elites, who 
sought to decrease heterogeneity and reinforce values that were considered to 
be the strength of American society; and organized labor, which sought to 
minimize the “unfair competition” of newly-arrived workers, who were more likely 
to accept harsh working conditions and lower standards of living.65  The Quota 
Act of 1921 established immigration restrictions based on the 1910 census.  The 
Act permitted 3 percent of the foreign-born of each nationality, as enumerated in 
the census, to immigrate.  The restrictions imposed in the Quota Act of 1924 
permitted the immigration of a maximum of 2 percent of each nationality, as 
enumerated in the 1890 census.66  Other provisions of the 1924 law gave 
preference to the reunification of family members over employment needs.67  In 
addition, the law provided for the establishment of the Border Patrol.68  
Restrictions barring immigration from Asian countries remained intact.    
The agriculture industry was able to lobby for an exemption from 
quantitative restrictions on Western Hemisphere countries.69  Qualitative controls 
on these countries were created, and they included a requirement to 
demonstrate financial solvency, a literacy requirement, and a prohibition on 
contract labor.  These provisions were not strenuously enforced, however, due to 
a lack of infrastructure and a continued need for labor in the Southwestern 
states.70   
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In the 1930s, Mexican workers were deported due mainly to the 
dire economic conditions of the Depression.  When economic conditions 
improved around the start of World War II, the Bracero Program was initiated.  
This program, introduced in 1942, allowed for the importation of temporary 
agriculture and railroad workers under government-supervised contracts.  The 
program stopped after World War II ended, when U.S. service members returned 
to their civilian jobs.  It resumed during the Korean War, and continued until 
1954, when 1.3 million Mexicans were deported over a two-year period.  The 
program officially ended in 1964.71   
In 1943, a small immigration quota was extended to China, an ally 
of the U.S. in World War II.72  No other major immigration legislation was passed 
until 1952, when the McCarran-Walter Act73 became law.  The bill, which 
reaffirmed the quota system, was passed over President Truman’s veto.  He 
opposed the legislation because he believed it continued to promote racial and 
ethnic discrimination.74  The law allowed for the immigration of individuals of all 
ancestries, but established quotas based on the 1920 census.75  It also 
eliminated the requirement to file a declaration of intent to attain citizenship.76   
b. Military Service of Noncitizens 
The anti-immigrant sentiment that prevailed after WWI led to a 
prohibition on nondeclarant alien enlistments.77  Even so, there were some who 
believed a universal military conscription that included noncitizens would provide 
a means of educating “the great alien and illiterate population which otherwise, 
under the influence of unscrupulous and disloyal agitators, may become a 
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national menace.”78  A draft of all noncitizens did not occur.  Nonetheless, 80,000 
military members were naturalized in the intervening years between the two 
World Wars.79  The Nationality Act of 1940 provided for the naturalization of 
enlistees with honorable service of three years or more, without regard to length 
of residence in the U.S. or declaration of intention.80  
The Selective Service and Training Act of 1940 required all male 
declarant aliens between twenty-one and thirty-six years of age who resided in 
the United States to register for the draft.81  Within weeks of the U.S. entering 
WWII, nondeclarant aliens who were not from enemy nations were included in 
this registration.  As was the case in WWI, those who claimed exemption 
forfeited the opportunity of future citizenship.82   
For enlistment purposes, aliens were classified in one of three 
categories:  1) cobelligerent; 2) neutral; or 3) enemy or allied with enemy.  
Individuals in the first two categories were acceptable if they were physically 
qualified, and if they did not require investigation by the Army.  Those in the third 
category, if otherwise deemed acceptable with respect to security concerns and 
physical qualifications, were allowed to enlist as long as they signed a statement 
agreeing to train and serve in the Army.  Japanese aliens, however, were 
expressly prohibited by this regulation from enlisting.83  A total of 30,000 aliens 
from enemy countries served in the Army during WWII.84 
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Over 109,000 noncitizens (roughly 36 percent of foreign-born 
service members) joined the Army between July 1, 1940 and June 30, 1945.85  
Canada, Mexico, Germany, Italy, and Great Britain contributed the largest 
proportions of noncitizen soldiers.86  The restrictive immigration policy 
implemented in the early 1920s seems to have had a noticeable effect on the 
comparable percentages of older noncitizens and citizens in the military:  for 
example, 64 percent of noncitizen enlistees were older than 35 years of age, 
compared with only 30 percent of their citizen counterparts.87       
A large number of immigrants who served during the war were able 
to attain citizenship.  A total of 142,353 enlistees were naturalized between July 
1, 1941 and June 30, 1947.88  Immediately after the war, however, immigrants 
were barred from enlisting.  In 1948, declarant aliens were again permitted to 
serve due to mounting Cold War manpower requirements.89    
In 1950, the Lodge Act was passed, authorizing the enlistment of 
2,500 residents of Eastern Europe.  The intent of this legislation was to provide 
the U.S. with a pool of skilled individuals who could assist with the Cold War 
effort.  The law was amended in 1951 to increase the number authorized to 
12,500.  Enlistees who completed five years of honorable service were eligible 
for permanent residence in the United States.  Of the 1,302 individuals who 
enlisted under this program, 812 (63 percent) became citizens.90   
Under a special agreement between the Filipino government and 
the U.S. Navy, the Philippines Enlistment Program (PEP) was established in 
1952 as part of the Republic of the Philippines - United States Military Bases 
Agreement (RP-US MBA).  Between 1952 and 1991, over 35,000 Filipinos 
rough this intensely competitive program that allowed enlisted in the U.S. Navy th                                            
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Filipino nationals to attain citizenship through U.S. military service.91  This special 
relationship between the Philippines and the U.S. Navy stemmed from the U.S. 
colonization of the Philippine Islands in the early twentieth century. 
Section 1440 of Title 8 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 
1952 expanded citizenship eligibility to include noncitizens who enlisted, 
reenlisted, or extended enlistments while residing in U.S. territories, or while 
aboard a public vessel owned or operated by the United States.  It also provided 
for the naturalization of individuals who served during wartime, whether or not 
they were documented immigrants.92  Congress enacted legislation in 1953 that 
limited citizenship eligibility to only documented immigrants.  This provision 
applied to individuals who served in the armed forces from June 25, 1950 
through July 1, 1955.  The provision expired in 1955, and in 1961 Congress 
enacted legislation that authorized the naturalization of undocumented immigrant 
enlistees who had served during this five-year period.93 
The 1961 law also revoked the 1894 prohibition against 
nondeclarant alien peacetime service, thereby allowing an individual’s lawful 
admission to the United States to serve as the minimum criterion for enlistment.94  
With passage of this 1961 law, immigration restrictions effectively became the 
most critical limiting factor on the enlistment of noncitizens in the armed forces.    
4. 1965 - PRESENT 
a. Immigration and Naturalization Policy 
The national origin quota system established in 1921 and amended 
in 1924 had a marked effect on the number of foreign-born residents in the 
United States.  From 1940 through 1950, the percentage of foreign-born  
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individuals declined from 9 percent to 6 percent of the total population.95  By the 
mid-1960s, a consensus for changing the nation’s immigration policy had 
emerged.   
The Kennedy-Johnson Amendment to the McCarran-Walter Law of 
1952, also known as the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) of 1965, 
resulted from the growing pressures of diverse interest groups.96  “New” 
Europeans who had significant political power, and were concerned primarily with 
family reunification, were able to co-opt labor allies within the Democratic party.  
These representatives of labor sought to ensure labor immigration would not be 
significantly increased, and hoped to include Western Hemisphere immigration in 
the annual allowable total.  The two groups were able to lobby together 
successfully for a complete revision of immigration policy.97   
The INA of 1965 set ceilings of 170,000 for immigrants from the 
Eastern Hemisphere, and 120,000 for those from the Western Hemisphere.  The 
latter figure was below the flow of immigrants from the Western Hemisphere at 
that time.  A cap of 20,000 was established for each country in the Eastern 
Hemisphere, with no corresponding cap for Western Hemispheric nations.98  The 
racial quota system ended, along with policies that limited immigration by Asians.  
Unlike the INA of 1952, which allotted relatively equal shares of 
immigrant positions to family members and workers,99 the INA 1965 legislation 
dedicated 84 percent of the positions to family reunification, with 10 percent for 
employment and 6 percent for refugees.  In addition, all non-family member 
immigrants “were required to obtain a labor clearance certifying that American 
workers were not available for their jobs and that the immigrants would not lower 
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prevailing wages and working conditions.”100  With passage of this legislation, 
nicknamed the “Brothers and Sisters Act,” an immigration policy was 
institutionalized that gave clear preference to family reunification.101   
The INA of 1965 has promoted consistently increasing levels of 
immigration.  The strong emphasis on family reunification has favored individuals 
who desire to immigrate and have family members who are citizens or 
permanent residents of the United States.  As described below, the most 
profound effect of the law has been the increase in undocumented immigration 
that has occurred since this law was passed.102  Amendments to the original bill 
have sought to address the issues of undocumented immigration and a strong 
bias toward family reunification.103   
In 1976, a revised preference system placed an annual cap of 
20,000 on immigrants from each Western Hemispheric nation.  This change 
actually exacerbated the flow of undocumented immigrants from Mexico, as the 
yearly stream of Mexicans had averaged roughly 60,000 before this change.104  
Two years later, the law was again revised, placing a ceiling of 290,000 on 
immigration, without regard for hemisphere.105  In 1979, the worsening economic 
situation, compounded by the media’s coverage of illegal immigration, led to the  
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establishment of the Select Committee on Immigration Reform Policy.  The 
recommendations of this committee ultimately resulted in passage of the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986.106 
The 1986 law strengthened the Border Patrol and established 
employee sanctions for knowingly employing undocumented workers.  In 
practice, however, it was often difficult to prove an employer was aware that a 
person’s immigration documentation had been falsified.  A final provision granted 
amnesty to 2.7 million undocumented workers who had lived in the United States 
since 1982.107   
In 1990, a flexible annual cap of 675,000 was established.108  
Approximately 70 percent of the positions were allotted for family members, 20 
percent for employment visas, and 10 percent for diversity visas.109,110  Since 
1997, undocumented workers who are returned to their countries of origin must 
wait a minimum of three years to receive a visa to travel to the United States.111  
An estimated 300,000 undocumented immigrants arrive in the U.S. annually, with 
45 percent from Latin America, 20 percent from the Caribbean, and 20 percent 
from Asia.  Currently, Mexico is the single-largest source of undocumented 
immigrants.112 
b. Military Service of Noncitizens 
The INA was amended in 1968 to allow for the naturalization of 
immigrants who served in the armed forces during the Vietnam War.113  The 
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amended legislation also provided for the naturalization of noncitizen enlistees 
who might serve during any period of military hostilities to be defined by future 
Executive Orders.114  In 1978, Executive Order 12081 allowed for the 
naturalization of noncitizens who served during the Vietnam Conflict, as defined 
by the time period February 28, 1961 through October 15, 1978.115  Executive 
Order 12939 was issued in 1994 to permit the naturalization of Gulf War veterans 
who served any time between August 2, 1990 and April 11, 1991.116   
Operation Enduring Freedom began in the fall of 2001. The 
provisions of Executive Order 13269, signed in July 2002, apply for as long a 
period as the operation continues.117  In keeping with the provisions of this 
Executive Order, Congress enacted legislation in November 2003 that provides 
for expedited citizenship of noncitizen military members.  Service time is reduced 
from three years to one year, with no permanent residency time requirement.  In 
addition, immigrant service members may receive expedited posthumous 
citizenship.118  The time required for naturalization processing of service 
members may be as little as three months.119      
From 1988 through 2001, noncitizens have comprised 
approximately 3.5 percent of the enlisted force in the U.S. military.120  In major 
urban areas, such as New York and Los Angeles, a large number of potential 
enlistees are noncitizens.  In 2003, Army officials estimated that approximately 
two-thirds of potential recruits who inquire about enlistment at the Flushing, New 
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York recruiting office hail from other countries.121  In New York City, in 2001, the 
Department of Defense estimated the percentages of immigrant recruits enlisted 
in the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps were 27 percent, 40 percent, and 36 
percent, respectively.122  At present, the only de facto ceiling on noncitizen first-
term enlistments is the requirement to hold a security clearance in certain military 
occupations.  No federal legislation or service-specific policy presently limits the 
number of noncitizen first-term enlistments.  The Army and Air Force do, 
however, limit noncitizen service to a maximum of eight years.123    
Although the enlistment of illegal immigrants is expressly 
prohibited, undocumented immigrants have served in the U.S. military throughout 
the nation’s history.  In fact, the standards for Selective Service registration, as 
set forth in the 1971 Selective Service Act, do not actually stipulate legal entry 
into the United States.  Individuals required to register include all aliens between 
the ages of eighteen and thirty-five years, regardless of the legal status of their 
immigration.124   
The only noncitizen recruits for whom additional security checks are 
automatically implemented are those whose home country is deemed hostile to 
the United States.125  Stories of undocumented immigrants who have enlisted 
and been granted amnesty for their military service are not uncommon.126  In  
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response to the acknowledged service of numerous undocumented immigrants, 
the Department of Defense announced a plan to “prescreen” noncitizen recruits 
starting in the spring of 2004.127   
According to some legal experts, Executive Order 13269 of July 
2002 does not preclude undocumented immigrant enlistees from obtaining 
citizenship for their service.128  At least one undocumented Army enlistee who 
served in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Private Juan Escalante, has received 
considerable media attention.  In February 2004, Private Escalante achieved a 
long-standing dream when he raised his hand and promised to defend his 
country, the United States – as he recited the citizenship oath.129   
                                            
127 Bruce Finley, “Military Eyeing ‘Unknowns’: Thousands in Ranks May Not Be Citizens,” 
Denver Post, February 24, 2004. 
128 Florangela Davila, “Army Says Illegal-Immigrant Soldier Can Stay,” Seattle Times, 
September 12, 2003; and Donatella Lorch, “A Matter of Loyalty: He Joined the Army with a Fake 
Green Card.  Now What?” Newsweek, November 3, 2003. 
129 Florangela Davila, “Army Private Receives New Rank: U.S. Citizen,” Seattle Times, 
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III. INTERVIEWS WITH NONCITIZEN ENLISTEES 
To gain a deeper understanding of the individuals who currently serve as 
noncitizen enlistees, one may explore their histories and motivations in the 
context of a broader canvas.  Many of these personal histories are tied directly to 
U.S. policy.  The combination of personal and global perspectives paints a more 
expansive picture of the U.S. military and the nation.   
A. PROFILE OF INTERVIEWEES 
Ten enlistees from the Army, Navy, and Air Force were interviewed to gain 
a better understanding of their perspectives and motivations.  All ten of the 
enlistees joined the military as noncitizens; five had attained citizenship since the 
year 2000.  One of the interviewees was in the Army’s Delayed Entry Program 
(DEP) waiting to start active duty at the time of the interview.  All others were on 
active duty; nine of the ten were men.  Table 1 provides information on their 
national origin and service affiliation. 
 
Table 1. National Origin of Interviewees, by Service 
 
   Army   Navy   Air Force 
Philippine Islands  2 2* 
Mexico 2   
Cambodia  1  
Ghana  1  
Nigeria  1  
Iran   1 
* One of the two interviewees is a woman.   
 
B. RELATIONSHIP TO FORCE COMPOSITION 
Although this sample is small and not randomly selected, the interviewees 
are from geographic areas that are well-represented in the U.S. military.  More 
than 37,000 noncitizen enlistees from over 200 different countries were 
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estimated to be serving on active-duty in February 2003.130  Appendix A provides 
a list of source countries and the number of enlistees serving from each.  The 
first- and second-largest source countries for noncitizen recruits are the 
Philippines and Mexico.  In February 2003, non-naturalized Filipinos and 
Mexicans comprised 15 percent and 11 percent, respectively, of all noncitizen 
enlistees in the armed forces.131  The total number of noncitizens serving on 
active duty as of September 2003 was 32,918.132   
The combination of post-1965 immigration and naturalization policy, 
economics, and political-cultural linkages explains the large percentages of Asian 
and Latin American immigrants who arrive in the U.S. annually.  Mexico and, until 
recent years, the Philippines,133 have dominated the immigrant flow from their 
respective regions.  The family, social, and economic networks formed by these 
immigrant communities serve to perpetuate “chain migration”:  the tendency for 
immigrants to follow in the footsteps of those who have gone before them.134   
The large number of Filipinos who move to the U.S. each year, and the 
large number that choose to enlist, are directly related to the history of relations 
between the United States and the Philippines.  Strong military, political, and 
cultural linkages developed between the two countries after the Philippine Islands 
became a U.S. territory at the end of the Spanish-American War.  Since 1970, 5 
percent of all legal immigrants have been Filipino, making the Philippines the 
second-largest source country of immigrants for the years 1970-1998.135   
                                            
130 Defense Manpower Data Center, Monterey, California:  “Non-U.S. Citizens on Active 
Duty as of February 2003.” 
131 Ibid.  
132 Defense Manpower Data Center, Monterey, California:  “Citizenship Status as of 
September 2003.” 
133 Since 1998 immigration from China and India has rivaled, and in some years surpassed, 
immigration from the Philippines. 
134 Robert W. Gardner and Leon F. Bouvier, “The United States,” 351. 
135 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 
http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/IMM02yrbk/IMM2002.pdf, accessed January 
2004. 
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Mexico’s ties to the United States are also deeply-rooted.  Mexico has 
historically provided the U.S. with low-cost labor, while the U.S. has offered 
Mexicans broader economic opportunity.  Mexicans now account for 20 percent 
of legal immigrants each year,136 and the majority of undocumented immigrants.  
Geographic proximity and economics inextricably link the two countries. 
The composition of the noncitizen component of the active-duty force is a 
direct result of the dynamic between policy, economics, and social forces.  
Hence, the Philippines and Mexico represent the two largest immigrant enlistee 
groups.  In the case of the Philippines, the strong American presence in the 
country throughout most of the twentieth century directly led to increased 
numbers of Filipinos with English-language proficiency.  The Philippine Enlisted 
Program (PEP), discussed in Chapter II, furthered the already strong ties 
between the two countries, and led to steady streams of Filipino immigrants into 
the U.S. Navy throughout the latter half of the twentieth century.  Though PEP 
was discontinued after 1992, Filipinos continue to comprise the largest proportion 
of noncitizen first-term enlistees from any one country in the Navy.137  They are 
also the largest group of noncitizen first-term enlistees in the Air Force.138     
C. SUMMARY OF MAJOR TOPICS ADDRESSED IN INTERVIEWS 
Five general topics were discussed in each of the interviews:  the reason 
why the enlistee and/or the enlistee’s family chose to immigrate; whether 
immigration was a family or individual decision; the level of formal education 
completed by the enlistee; the motivations for enlistment; and the individual’s 
plans for the future.  What follows is a summary of the responses of the 
interviewees, linkages between these responses and certain principles of 
immigration theory, and, where appropriate, implications for the recruiting and 
retention of enlistees who join the military as noncitizens.      
 
                                            
136 Ibid. 
137 Defense Manpower Data Center, Monterey, California:  Descriptive Statistics of Fiscal 
Year 1990-1998 Enlistee Cohorts, provided September 2003. 
138 Ibid. 
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D. MOTIVATIONS FOR IMMIGRATION 
People choose to immigrate for a variety of reasons.  In the broadest 
sense, immigration is a way to achieve material improvement.139  In addition to 
the economic reasons for immigration, various other factors operate to “push” 
and “pull” persons, as they leave one country for another.  Contemporary 
theories view the immigration phenomenon from several perspectives, including 
economic, social, and political. 
Utility maximization, or the desire to achieve the maximum level of 
satisfaction possible given one’s limited resources,140 is an important motivation 
for many immigrants, and a concept that spans various disciplines of immigration 
theory.  Satisfaction encompasses both economic and non-monetary aspects of 
life.  Present and future costs and benefits, both psychological and monetary, are 
considered before making the decision to immigrate.   
The possibility for greater opportunity was the most commonly stated 
motivation for immigration voiced by the ten enlistees who participated in the 
interviews.  For nine of the ten individuals, the possibility of greater economic 
and/or educational opportunity was the most important reason mentioned.  The 
one interviewee for whom it was not the overriding factor came to the United 
States as a political refugee.   
When asked about his parents’ decision to move with their two sons to the 
U.S., one of the eight enlistees who immigrated with his family stated, 
“They…sacrificed their lives for us.”  His parents had retired and could have lived 
comfortably in their homeland, but believed moving to the United States would 
substantially benefit their children.  Another interviewee referred to his parents’ 
decision to immigrate based on the chance for a better future for him and his 
siblings.  And one of the two enlistees who immigrated as an adult mentioned the 
desire to improve the lives of his children as a motivating factor for immigration.       
                                            
139 Douglas S. Massey and others, Worlds in Motion (New York:  Oxford University Press, 
1998), 1. 
140 Ronald G. Ehrenberg and Robert S. Smith, Modern Labor Economics:  Theory and Public 
Policy, 8th ed., (Boston:  Pearson Addison Wesley, 2003), 3. 
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E. FAMILY DECISION 
Most of the interviewees believed the choice to immigrate was a family 
decision.  Eight of the ten enlistees said they and/or their parents and other 
family members (both within the U.S. and within their native countries) jointly 
decided to move to the United States.  All eight of these individuals arrived in this 
country before they were financially independent, that is, while they were either 
legal minors or still students.  The only two individuals for whom the decision was 
not part of a family process moved to the U.S. when they were unmarried adults.  
Immigration based on a family decision is consistent with U.S. immigration 
policy, in that more than 70 percent of visas are granted to family members.141  
In this small sample, six of the ten interviewees received family sponsorship 
visas.  Two others were the recipients of diversity visas, and two were 
undocumented immigrants.  The concept of a family-based decision is also 
consistent with the desire to minimize the costs and risks associated with 
immigration.  Families that share the economic costs and returns of moving to 
another country are often better able to maximize income, particularly in 
countries where labor, credit, and capital markets are faulty.  Part of this 
cost/reward sharing often involves sending monetary support, or remittances, to 
relatives in their homeland.142  Of the ten enlistees, eight said that they or their 
parents send remittances to family members in their native countries.     
A concept related to the idea of immigration as a family decision is that of 
immigrant networks that develop and become institutionalized in societies.  
Networks serve to lower the costs associated with moving to a new country.   
                                            
141 DeSipio and de la Garza, Making Americans, Remaking America, 47.  
142 Oded Stark and David E. Bloom, “The New Economics of Labor Migration,” The 
American Economic Review 75, no. 2 (1985): 174.   
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They are self-perpetuating, since the increased social capital143 associated with 
additional members of a community migrating to the same region tends to 
encourage more movement, or what is called chain migration.144   
Of the ten individuals interviewed, eight moved to states with significant 
immigrant populations.  They and/or their families arrived and initially settled in 
areas with historically large proportions of immigrants from their countries or 
regions of the world.  The two individuals from Africa moved to New Jersey; one 
enlistee from Mexico moved to Arizona, and the other to California; the recruit 
from Iran settled in California; and three of the four Filipinos moved to 
communities in California.  The two enlistees who did not settle in states with 
high concentrations of immigrants from their countries are the individual from 
Cambodia, whose family came to the U.S. as political refugees and settled in 
San Antonio, and the Filipina enlistee, whose family settled in Alaska, where her 
aunt, the family’s sponsor, was stationed in the U.S. Air Force.         
F. LEVEL OF EDUCATION 
Education is a topic of interest in this study because of the dynamics 
associated with education and immigration.  Higher levels of education are 
generally equated with increased employment opportunities.  At the same time, 
evidence suggests that greater benefit is gained from education acquired after 
immigration to the U.S. than before an individual leaves his or her homeland.145   
The impressions gathered in these interviews correspond with this finding.  
Of the five enlistees who acquired all their education in their native countries, 
three obtained associate’s degrees, one attended some college, and one 
obtained a high school diploma prior to arriving in the U.S.  Of the five who 
                                            
143 “Social capital is the sum of the resources…that accrue to an individual or a group by 
virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual 
acquaintance and recognition.”  Pierre Bourdieu and Loic Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive 
Sociology, 3rd ed. (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1992), 119, quoted in Douglas S. 
Massey and others, Worlds in Motion (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1998), 42.  
144 Douglas S. Massey, “The Social and Economic Origins of Immigration,” Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 510 (1990): 60. 
145 Julian R. Betts and Magnus Lofstrom, “The Educational Attainment of Immigrants,” in 
Issues in the Economics of Immigration, ed. George J. Borjas, (Chicago:  The University of 
Chicago Press, 2000), 109. 
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acquired their highest level of education in the United States, none achieved a 
degree beyond a high school diploma before joining the military, and only one of 
the five completed some amount of college before enlisting.  Thus, the recruits 
with associate’s degrees, who might have pursued non-military employment or 
furthered their education if they had achieved their degree in the United States, 
elected to enlist in the military to gain job experience and earn money for 
advanced education.    
Another finding associated with immigration and education is that the 
“sheepskin effect”146 of a high school diploma is weaker for immigrants than for 
their citizen counterparts.  In other words, evidence suggests that many 
employers place very little, if any, economic value on high school completion if it 
occurred in a foreign country.147  Since none of the enlistees who immigrated 
after completing high school had obtained a four-year college degree before they 
arrived in the U.S., the implicit “devaluation” of their education in the eyes of 
employers may have been one motivating factor to enlist.       
G. MOTIVATIONS FOR ENLISTMENT 
Along with education, job training and experience were the most important 
reasons cited by enlistees for joining the military.  Three of the ten enlistees 
mentioned job stability as the top priority, while another three said job training 
was the overriding consideration for enlistment.  One individual valued most the 
educational opportunities offered by the military.  Two others enlisted for 
adventure, and one of these two individuals highly valued educational benefits.  
The Filipina enlistee joined to follow in the footsteps of her grandfather, who had 
served in the Marine Corps, and her aunt, who was still on active duty in the Air 
Force.  
 
                                            
146 “Sheepskin effect” refers to an upward bias in returns to education, i.e. expected wages 
for an individual with a high school diploma are higher than for a non-diploma graduate, or for an 
individual with no high school diploma.   
147 Julian R. Betts and Magnus Lofstrom, “The Educational Attainment of Immigrants:  
Trends and Implications,” 109.   
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The four Filipino enlistees had either friends or relatives who had been 
members of one branch or another of the U.S. armed forces.  This observation 
reflects the existence of a well-established network of active-duty and retired 
service members of Filipino ethnicity.  The other six enlistees did not know 
anyone in the military prior to starting the enlistment process.      
Each of the three enlistees who placed the greatest value on job training 
knew nothing about the military before answering a newspaper advertisement 
that referenced training opportunities.  Upon answering the ad, each spoke with a 
military recruiter.  Ironically, two of these three individuals inquired about specific 
types of training, but were ineligible due to security clearance requirements for 
the jobs associated with the particular training.  In all, six enlistees were unable 
to obtain the military occupation of their choice due to security clearance 
constraints.148  Two of the five interviewees who have yet to attain citizenship 
said they do not intend to reenlist, or pursue a commissioning program in one 
case, unless they become citizens and are able to change career fields.         
Only two of the enlistees said they considered expedited citizenship to be 
a motivation for enlistment.  Of the two who acknowledged expedited 
naturalization as a motivation, one is enlisted in the Army Delayed Entry 
Program.  Prior to the interview, he was unaware of the November 2003 
legislation that decreased the service requirement for naturalization eligibility 
from three years to one year.149     
Though none of the interviewees mentioned a desire for assimilation as a 
motivation to serve, this phenomenon is well-documented in sociology 
literature.150  It is quite possible that noncitizen enlistees are either reluctant to 
discuss this issue, or are unaware of their intrinsic motivation to assimilate into 
                                            
148 Occupational fields that include areas such as intelligence, information technology, 
nuclear engineering, and aircraft maintenance all require security clearances.  Noncitizens may 
not serve in these fields.  Occupational specialties that include areas such as supply/logistics, 
construction, and health care do not require security clearances and are available to noncitizens.   
149 See Appendix B for a comparison of the naturalization timeline for military enlistee and 
civilian immigrants.  
150 David W. Chen and Somini Sengupta, “A Nation Challenged:  The Recruits; Not Yet 
Citizens but Eager to Fight for the U.S.,” New York Times, October 26, 2001.  
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society in their new homeland.  In either case, military service does offer an 
enlistee the opportunity to acquire a certain social status for oneself and his or 
her family.  Similarly, an enlistee’s relatives may be supportive of the service 
member as a means to facilitate the assimilation of the entire family.  And, 
veteran status offers social and economic advantages to former military 
members and their immediate relatives.                
H. FUTURE PLANS 
All enlistees were asked whether they intend to continue serving in the 
military.  Four of the ten plan to reenlist, or have already reenlisted.  One 
interviewee intended to separate to pursue opportunities in the civilian sector.  
Five were unsure whether they would continue serving.  Of these individuals, two 
said they would base their decision in part on whether they attain citizenship.  
One enlistee was only interested in continuing his service if he could attain an 
officer’s commission and become a pilot.  Since pilot positions require high-level 
security clearances, this recruit may only attain his goal by becoming a citizen.    
For the four individuals who were unsure about reenlistment, both 
personal and family considerations were important factors in their decision.  The 
process by which they would determine if reenlistment was the best alternative 
appears very similar to the decision-making process used by most citizens who 
wrestle with the option to reenlist. 
Most of the enlistees said they wanted to pursue more formal education 
whether or not they continued serving.  Only two individuals, one of whom was 
the Army recruit currently in the Delayed Entry Program, expressed no desire to 
further their education.  One interviewee was unsure of his education plans, and 
the remaining seven are fairly certain they will pursue a bachelor’s degree or 
higher.   
When asked if they would join the military again, four answered “yes” 
without qualifiers.  The Army recruit in the Delayed Entry Program is included in 
this category.  One individual would have pursued his education instead of 
enlisting.  The remaining five enlistees said they would join again, but included 
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caveats in their responses.  Two would have waited until they had attained 
citizenship to pursue an officer’s commission.  One would have waited for 
citizenship to pursue a career field that is closed to noncitizens.  Another would 
have requested a different field open to noncitizen enlistees, and two would enlist 
again, but in a different branch of the service.   
Almost all the interviewees would recommend the military to a friend or 
family member.  Only one would not.  Instead, he would recommend that the 
individual pursue university-level education.  Five enlistees, including the Army 
recruit enrolled in the Delayed Entry Program, would recommend enlistment 
without any qualifiers.  One would direct the relative or friend to specific ratings or 
job specialties.  Three said that the recommendation would hinge on the person 
and his or her specific situation. 
I. SUMMARY OF IMPRESSIONS 
All the enlistees who shared their thoughts felt that their military service 
had been a worthwhile endeavor.  Though their opportunities may have been 
somewhat restricted, they all claimed that their training and experiences were 
meaningful.  They felt they had learned important lessons about themselves, the 
military, and the United States.  Perhaps the statement of one enlistee about his 
experience best expresses the overall impression of the group:  “It showed me a 
broader America.”      
As a complement to the qualitative portion of this study, the performance 
of noncitizen enlistees is examined objectively in this thesis.  Statistical analyses 
of three specific measures of success were performed on enlisted cohort data 
files for Fiscal Years 1990-1998.151  The detailed results of this quantitative 
analysis are presented in the following chapter.     
 
                                            
151 Data were provided by Defense Manpower Data Center, Monterey, California.  Fiscal 
Years 1990-1998 enlistee cohort data were used in the analysis of estimated first-term attrition 
and retention beyond the first term.  Fiscal Years 1996-1998 enlistee cohort data were used in 
the analysis of predicted promotion to E-4.  
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IV. ANALYSIS OF SUCCESS OF NONCITIZEN ENLISTEES 
Three measures of success traditionally analyzed in military manpower 
literature are first-term attrition, retention beyond the first term, and promotion to 
E-4.  All three measures of success are analyzed in this thesis to examine 
objectively the performance of noncitizen enlistees.  Numerous studies have 
addressed the issues of attrition, retention, and promotion in the armed forces.  
This chapter provides a selective overview of the approaches presented in these 
studies that are used to specify the models in this thesis.   
A discussion of the data and variables follows the literature review.  
Descriptive statistics are also presented for the data set.  Model specification and 
the results of the logit regression analyses are then discussed.   
A. LITERATURE REVIEW:  ATTRITION, RETENTION, AND PROMOTION 
MODELS 
Attrition before the end of an enlistee’s first term is costly to the armed 
forces.  To analyze the factors that contribute to attrition, military manpower 
models include demographic and economic data to predict the success of first-
term enlistees.  Similarly, retention, and promotion outcomes offer a gauge by 
which the armed forces may measure the success of its recruiting and 
assignment policies. Thus, attrition, retention, and promotion outcomes may be 
considered indicators of the successful performance of entering enlistees.   
1. Attrition  
a. Study by Quester and Kimble152 
In their 2001 study entitled “Final Report:  Street-to-Fleet Study, 
Volume I:  Street-to-Fleet for the Enlisted Force,” Quester and Kimble analyze 
Marine Corps recruiting data between 1979 and 1999. Both Marine Corps 
Recruiting Depot (MCRD) attrition and first-term attrition are used as measures of  
                                            
152 Aline Quester, and Theresa H. Kimble, “Final Report: Street-to-Fleet Study, Volume I: 
Street-to-Fleet for the Enlisted Force,” Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), 2001. 
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recruit attrition. Level of education, time spent in the Delayed Entry Program 
(DEP),153 race, and Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score are found to 
be significant characteristics that affect MCRD attrition.  
First-term attrition for contracts of at least four years is defined as 
attrition that occurs within the first forty-five months of service. The authors also 
state that in the 1990s, the majority of first-term contracts (80-85 percent) were 
four years in length. The results of the study demonstrate that accession through 
DEP is associated with lower first-term attrition. In addition, high-school diploma 
graduate (HSDG), Hispanic or Black ethnic background, and high AFQT scores 
are predictive of lower first-term attrition rates.  
b. Study by Buttrey and Larson154 
The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel (ODCSPER) 
commissioned a study to develop a new system to estimate future manning 
needs of the Army.  The military strength management system that had 
previously been used for over twenty years had become obsolete and inefficient. 
ODCSPER opted to endorse a new design, equipped with the latest 
technologies, to overcome the problems of the old system. Much of the structure 
of the previous system, especially the Enlisted Loss Inventory Model (ELIM), 
which predicted first-term attrition and retention of enlisted personnel, was 
retained in the new system: 
This current ELIM model bases its projections on characteristic 
groups (c-groups), whose structure has remained unchanged since 
the strength management system was initially implemented. These 
c-groups partition first-term enlisted personnel according to sex, 
education level, mental category (AFQT group) and term of service 
in a specific way. They were originally designed, in part, to identify 
differences in first-term retention behavior, which in turn was 
expected to increase accuracy in short- and long-term forecasting 
accuracy.155 
                                            
153 Individuals who participate in the Delayed Entry Program wait some period of time (up to 
one year) before reporting to boot camp.  
154 Samuel E. Buttrey, and Harold J. Larson, “Determining Characteristic Groups to Predict 
Army Attrition,” Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 1999. 
155 Ibid, 1. 
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In recent years the accuracy of the projections done by the ELIM 
model has not been satisfactory. Buttrey and Larson developed a Classification 
and Regression Tree methodology (CART) to generate new c-groups for the use 
of ODCSPER’s new military strength management system.  The variables used 
in building classification trees are: AFQT score, race, sex, length of term, age, 
time spent in DEP, career management field (CMF), and education level. The 
results of the study suggest that contract completion rates among men (53.8 
percent) are considerably higher than the rates for women (36.3 percent). 
Furthermore, higher education, higher AFQT score and certain CMFs (armor, 
infantry and service support) are associated with higher contract completion 
rates. The authors also determine that non-Caucasians have lower attrition, 
higher term completion, and higher reenlistment rates than Caucasians.    
c. Study by Hattiangadi, Lee and Quester156   
This report by CAN focuses on the performance of Hispanic recruits 
in the Marine Corps.  Success of recruits is measured by two indicators: 
completion of entry-level training (boot camp), and completion of the first term of 
service. Boot- camp attrition rates are analyzed for the period 1970-2001. 
Tabulations show that the average boot-camp attrition rate is lower for Hispanic 
men, as compared with non-Hispanics. The logit regression method is then used 
to estimate predicted attrition probabilities. The authors include AFQT categories, 
meeting weight and height standards, DEP participation, summer accessions, 
enlistment waiver, college fund recipient, enlistment bonus recipient, noncitizen 
status, race/ethnic background, and fiscal year dummy variables to estimate boot 
camp and first-term attrition probabilities.   
The results indicate that Hispanic men have lower predicted boot-
camp attrition rates than do non-Hispanic men, all else equal. The difference 
varies between 5.1 percentage points and 2.8 percentage points, depending on 
the specific ethnic background of recruits (e.g., Mexican, Puerto Rican, etc.).   
                                            
156 Anita U. Hattiangadi, Gary Lee and Aline O. Quester, “Recruiting Hispanics: The Marine 
Corps Experience Final Report,” Center for Naval Analyses, January 2004. 
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The effect of Hispanic ethnicity is found to be even larger for first-term attrition. 
According to the report, the estimated first-term attrition rate is 11 percentage 
points lower for Hispanic men, as compared with non-Hispanic men.  
Another significant finding of the study that relates directly to this 
thesis is the statistical significance of the noncitizen variable in both attrition 
models. The predicted first-term attrition rate for male noncitizens is 8.2 
percentage points lower than the estimated rate for male citizens.  
2. Retention  
a. Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) Model 
The ACOL model was first introduced in 1984 by Enns, Nelson and 
Warner.157  Since its development, this model has been one of the most 
commonly used frameworks for analyzing enlisted retention behavior.  
The stay-or-leave decision is assumed to entail a comparison 
between the individual’s current military occupation and potential alternative 
civilian occupation, with consideration given to both pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
attributes of each alternative. Economic theory suggests a rational individual 
would choose the alternative that yields the greatest satisfaction or utility. The 
ACOL model involves a comparison between the discounted value of expected 
military and civilian compensation streams.  
The military pay stream for enlisted personnel includes Regular 
Military Compensation (RMC), Selective Reenlistment Bonuses (SRBs), and 
retirement pay. All these compensations have different time horizons. For 
example, an increase in RMC would be effective throughout the individual’s 
military career, but retirement benefits can only be attained after the successful 
completion of twenty years of service. The ACOL approach addresses this 
problem by combining all the elements of compensation into a single measure.158  
The annualized cost of leaving is the difference between the present value of 
both the military and civilian earnings over a given future time horizon:  
                                            
157 Matthew S. Goldberg, “A Survey of Enlisted Retention:  Models and Findings,” Center for 
Naval Analyses, November 2001, 6. 
158 Ibid, 8. 
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The major contributions of the model (are) that it provide(s) a 
rational basis for determining the horizon over which military and 
civilian pay are compared, and it relate(s) the estimated retention 
equation more directly to individual utility maximizing decisions.159 
The ACOL variable is the difference between the discounted value 
of future benefits from staying ( ) and the value of leaving immediately ( ): 
( - ). A positive value of ACOL suggests the individual will stay in the military.  
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where,  
M
jW  expected military pay in each future year j 
,
C
j tW  civilian earnings in future year j if the individual leaves at year t 
,
C
j nW  civilian earnings in future year j if the individual separates after 
future year n 
nR  expected present value at future year n of retired pay and other 
separation benefits if the individual separates after year n 
tR  present value at year t of retired pay and other separation benefits 
if the person leaves now 
mτ    taste factor for military lifestyle 
                                            
159 Paul F. Hogan and Matthew Black, “Reenlistment Models: A Methodological Review,” 
U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Science, February 1991, 24. 
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cτ  taste factor for civilian lifestyle 
ρ  individual’s subjective discount rate on future income 
,t nS  present value of the future benefits from staying from period t to 
period n  
tL  present value of leaving immediately 
b. Study by Warner and Goldberg160  
In their 1984 study, “The Influence of Non-Pecuniary Factors on 
Labor Supply:  The Case of Navy Enlisted Personnel,” Warner and Goldberg 
analyze the effects of non-pecuniary factors, such as the frequency of expected 
sea duty, on the actual reenlistment rates of Navy enlisted personnel.  Most of 
the research prior to this study examines the effect of wage differentials on the 
elasticity of labor supply, but does not include the effect of other non-monetary 
factors. The focus of Warner and Goldberg’s study is the effect of Navy sea duty 
on the elasticity of the Navy enlisted personnel reenlistment supply. The initial 
hypothesis of the authors is that a higher incidence of sea duty causes the 
reenlistment supply curve to move to the left and become more elastic, resulting 
in a decreased number of enlisted personnel at any given wage.  
Warner and Goldberg create an ACOL variable to examine the 
effect of monetary factors. To simulate the effect of sea duty, Navy enlisted 
ratings are classified into 16 occupational areas on the basis of similarity of 
training, job requirement, and working conditions. Fiscal-year dummy variables 
are also included in the model.    
The results of the study suggest there is a negative correlation (-
0.49) between the coefficient of the ACOL variable and the percentage of 
careerists in sea duty. The coefficient for the ACOL variable is positive and highly 
significant, and explains much of the variation in the probability of reenlisting. 
This correlation supports the hypothesis that reenlistment supply curves are less 
acterized with a high incidence of sea duty. Warner elastic in occupations char
                                            
160 John T. Warner and Matthew S. Goldberg, “The Influence of Non-Pecuniary Factors on 
Labor Supply: The Case of Navy Enlisted Personnel,” The Review of Economics and Statistics 
66, no. 1, February 1984, 26-35. 
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and Goldberg also determine that married individuals have higher reenlistment 
rates. According to the authors, this finding may reflect a higher value placed on 
non-pecuniary aspects by married individuals.  
c. Study by Quester and Adedeji161   
In their 1991 study, “Reenlisting in the Marine Corps:  The Impact 
of Bonuses, Grade and Dependency Status,” Quester and Adedeji study the 
effects of enlisted Marines’ background traits on the reenlistment decision.  The 
authors suggest the Marine Corps is enlisting smarter and better-educated 
marines now than in the past. The recruiting records between 1979 and 1990 are 
supportive of this conclusion, as they indicate an increase in the ratio of “quality 
recruits” (AFQTI-IIIA and HSDG). Other major changes over the ten-year period 
are the increased rate of marriage by Marines, and the increased number of 
Marines who have one or more dependents. The main focus of this paper is the 
effect of reenlistment bonuses, pay grade and dependency status on the 
reenlistment of first-term enlisted personnel.  
Logistic regression analysis is used to estimate the reenlistment 
decision of first-term Marines. Control variables are Selective Reenlistment 
Bonus (SRB) level, pay grade, background characteristics (marital status, 
gender, race, education, and AFQT score), the length of initial contract, the 
Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) group, the index of military-to-civilian pay 
(pay index), and the civilian unemployment rate. In certain model specifications, 
fiscal-year control variables are used as proxies for pay index and 
unemployment-rate variables.  An interaction variable between SRB and AFQT is 
constructed to control for any additional impact that SRBs might have on the 
retention of Marines in the top two AFQT categories.  
The results suggest that higher SRBs, higher pay grade, higher pay 
indices, and longer initial enlistments are associated with higher reenlistment 
rates for first-term Marines.  A 1-percent increase in the pay index is associated 
with a 2.1-percent increase in the reenlistment rate.  Furthermore, women, 
                                            
161 Aline O. Quester and Adebayo M. Adedeji, “Reenlisting in the Marine Corps: The Impact 
of Bonuses, Grade, and Dependency Status,” Center for Naval Analyses, July 1991. 
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Blacks, and married Marines have higher probabilities of reenlistment than the 
base group, which includes men, Caucasians, and single enlistees.  Marines in 
the top two AFQT categories are less likely to reenlist.  However, SRBs have a 
positive effect on the reenlistment rates of Marines in these two test-score 
categories.  
d. Study by North162  
In his 1994 research paper, “A Cost-Effective Use of Selective 
Reenlistment Bonuses and Lateral Occupational Moves,” North studies the 
effects of SRBs and lateral movements on the probability of reenlistment of 
marines. The analysis is restricted to personnel who made the reenlistment 
decision in the first seventy-two months of service. Marines who are not eligible 
for reenlistment are not included in the data set.  
The author attempts to explain the probability of reenlistment in the 
first seventy-two months of service using a model that includes:  current SRB 
multiple, initial contract length, civilian unemployment rate, military-to-civilian pay 
ratio, and occupational fields. In the literature review, the author recognizes the 
importance of personal background characteristics such as marital status, 
gender, race, AFQT and education.  However, he does not include these 
variables in the model:  
Because planners want to project behavior in the fiscal year before 
the actual reenlistment decision, (they) want to restrict (the) factors to the 
variables that will not have considerable change during the year from planning to 
implementation.163 
The results of the study suggest that higher reenlistment 
probabilities are associated with:  higher bonus levels, a six-year first-term 
contract length, a higher civilian unemployment rate, and a higher military-to-
civilian pay ratio.  Nearly all occupational field variables are statistically significant 
at the 1-percent or 5-percent levels.  
                                            
162 James H. North, “A Cost Effective Use of Selective Reenlistment Bonuses and Lateral 
Occupation Moves,” Center for Naval Analyses, September 1994, 19-38. 
163 Ibid., 23. 
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3. Promotion 
In the paper, “What Characterizes Successful Enlistees in the All-
Volunteer Force: A Study of Male Recruits in the U.S. Navy,” Cooke and 
Quester164 attempt to identify the relationship between the background 
characteristics of men at the time they enlist in the U.S. Navy and their success 
in the military. Success in the military is measured by three indicators: completion 
of enlistment; completion of enlistment as a petty officer; and retention beyond 
the first term.  These three measures are similar to measures used in this thesis.  
Logit models are used to estimate the effect of background characteristics 
on enlistees’ success. The results of the study suggest AFQT score is highly 
significant in predicting “successful” recruits. Cooke and Quester also determine 
that African-American and Hispanic recruits have higher probabilities of 
completing their first terms, and of achieving the rank that makes them eligible for 
reenlistment. Recruits with a high school diploma and an AFQT score classified 
in Categories I-IIIa (commonly referred to as above-average AFQT scores) have 
a higher predicted rate of success than do non-diploma graduates and recruits 
whose AFQT scores are in categories IIIb-V.  The study suggests the most 
successful recruits are those with high school diplomas and an above-average 
AFQT scores. Moreover, participation in DEP is found to positively affect the 
probability of success in the Navy.  
B. ENLISTED PERSONNEL DATA 
The personnel data set was created by the Defense Manpower Data 
Center (DMDC), Monterey, California, based on original data provided by the 
Military Entrance Processing Command (MEPCOM).  The MEPCOM data file 
contains information about enlistees in all services for Fiscal Years 1990 through 
1998.  There is information for each recruit at accession and in Fiscal Year 2002, 
or the date of separation.  Since information is available only at these career 
points, the file is not a true longitudinal data file.  The file information was 
converted to SAS format for purposes of this analysis.  
                                            
164 Timothy W. Cooke and Aline O. Quester, “What Characterizes Successful Enlistees in 
the All-Volunteer Force:  A Study of Male Recruits in the U.S. Navy,” Social Science Quarterly 73, 
no. 2, June 1992, 238-251. 
43 
Based on the studies presented in the literature review, the samples 
analyzed in this thesis are limited to individuals with four-year first-term 
enlistment contracts.  The sample for the attrition, retention, and promotion 
models consists of non-prior service, active-duty enlistees with four-year initial 
contracts.165  Of all enlistment contract lengths, four-year contracts are the most 
common; more than 50 percent of the observations in this data set belong to this 
contract-length category.  Since the motivations and tastes of enlistees who opt 
for shorter or longer contracts may differ, this study focuses only on four-year 
enlistees.    
Since the Army and Air Force limit the enlistment of noncitizens to a 
maximum of eight years, prior-service enlistees in these two services contain 
almost no noncitizens.  Therefore, prior-service enlistees are not included in the 
samples.  Because Reserve Force policies regarding noncitizens differ from 
policies for active duty, Reserve enlistees are also excluded.  The number of 
observations for each service for Fiscal Years 1990 – 1998 that meets the 
restrictions described above is shown in Table 2. 
 




Total Number of 
Observations for  
FY 90–98 
Cohorts 
Total Number of 




Total Number of 
Observations for 
FY 90-98 Cohorts 
With 4-year Initial 
Contracts, Minus 
Age Deletions 
All Services 1,203,730 1,197,117 894,701 
Army 463,377 458,971 205,905 
Navy 300,347 298,246 294,808 
Air Force 218,098 218,041 202,064 
Marine Corps 221,908 221,859 191,924 
 
                                            
165 The promotion models also contain individuals with five-year and six-year first-term 
enlistment contracts.    
166 Any observation with age greater than 31 years was deleted from the data set.  
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The analysis sample for the attrition and retention models includes all nine 
entry cohorts.  The analysis sample for the promotion model excludes all new 
recruits who suffered first-term attrition.  It is also restricted to cohorts from Fiscal 
Years 1996 through 1998.  The data are restricted because the pay-grade 
variable in the data set is not available for each person for each year.  Therefore, 
it is impossible to determine an individual’s pay grade at any specific point in 
time.  Since it is almost certain that individuals with more than six years of 
service who are still serving on active duty would have attained the E-4 pay 
grade, the sample excludes these observations.  An additional reason for the 
exclusion is related to the higher retention rate of noncitizens (see Tables 3-7).  
Exclusion of Fiscal Year 1990 through 1995 cohorts serves to minimize self-
selection bias associated with the higher noncitizen retention rate.  The number 
of observations for each service for Fiscal Years 1996 – 1998 that matches the 
parameters described above is shown in Table 3.   
 
























All 517,665 514,562 422,842 215,412 
Army 204,082 201,945 112,287 44,715 
Navy 122,373 121,472 120,516 65,957 
Air Force 92,315 92,283 91,510 56,717 
Marine 
Corps 
98,895 98,862 98,529 48,023 
a Observations for enlistees with age greater than 31 years are deleted from the data set.   
b The sample is restricted to enlistees with four-year, five-year, and six-year contract lengths. 







C. VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS 
1. Dependent Variables 
The literature review reveals that three measures of success are 
commonly used, including first-term attrition, retention beyond the first term, and 
promotion to E-4.  These three measures are also analyzed in this study.  The 
top panel of Table 4 provides a description of the dependent variables. 
a. Indicator of First-Term Attrition  
To determine whether an individual stays long enough to complete 
the initial contract, the attrition variable is constructed as a dichotomous variable. 
The variable is coded as a ‘1’ if an individual stays for forty-five months or longer 
and as a ‘0’ if he or she leaves before completing forty-five months.  Forty-five 
months was chosen as the cut-off time since it is not uncommon for individuals to 
be allowed to separate from the military a few months prior to the true end of 
their enlistment contracts.  Since the military approves these requests, these 
individuals are considered to have completed their enlistments. 
b. Indicator of Retention Beyond First Term  
Either reenlisting for a second term or extending the initial contract 
is considered retention beyond the first term. The dependent variable in this 
model is a dichotomous variable that indicates whether an enlistee stays after 
four years of service. The variable is coded as a ‘1’ if there is no separation date, 
or if the length of service either in Fiscal Year 2002 or at the date of separation is 
greater than forty-eight months (four years), and as a ‘0’ otherwise. 
c. Indicator of Promotion to E-4  
Although promotion to E-4 is not very selective in any branch of the 
service, it is one of the eligibility requirements for reenlistment.  An enlistee who 
is reenlistment-eligible may be considered an asset to the armed forces. The 
dependent variable for this model is a binary variable that is coded as a ‘1’ if an 





2. Independent Variables 
Personal background characteristics used in all models include AFQT 
percentile, education categories, marital status, age (in years) at time of 
enlistment, race/ethnic group,167 and number of dependents.  All explanatory 
(independent) variables are listed in Table 4.  These variables have been used 
by researchers in prior studies to control for the effects of personal differences on 
attrition, retention and promotion.   
The noncitizen variable is created by using the citizenship code ‘spd’ in 
the data set. In each model, this variable captures the differences in ‘success’ 
between citizens and non-citizens. The unemployment variable is used only in 
the retention model, and is created using local area unemployment statistics for 
Fiscal Years 1994 through 2002168 in the state home of record of enlistees.  
Unemployment rates four years after the year of enlistment are used for each 
cohort to control for the economic conditions at the time of the reenlistment 
decision.  
The retention model lacks a crucial ACOL variable, since the data set 
does not include any monetary information (military pay and reenlistment 
bonuses) for the individuals.  In lieu of an ACOL variable, military occupational 
specialty (MOS) codes are included in the model.  The assumption is that the 
MOS-specific dummy variables will serve as proxies for the relative military and 
civilian employment opportunities.  Ten MOS variables were created using the 
first digit of the old MOS codes (the DoD Primary Occupation Codes [DPOCs]) 
found in the Department of Defense (DoD) occupational code conversion 
table169:   
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167 The data set includes observations for Native Americans that are coded as “noncitizen.”  
The Native American category includes individuals who describe themselves as either Eskimos, 
natives of the Aleutian Islands, or natives of North America.  Individuals who consider themselves 
to be members of the last category may be citizens of Mexico or Canada.  This may be the 
reason why observations for Native Americans exist in the data set.  
168 United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost?la, 
accessed February 2004. 
169 United States Department of Defense Occupational Database Manual, DoD 1312.1-1, 
http://www.odb.asmr.com/ode, accessed January 2004.  The old-to-new DoD occupation code 
conversion table is provided in Appendix C. The codes listed in column two (“Old DOD Code”) are 
used to create the retention model.  
This conversion table translates individual Service occupational 
designations into a common coding and occupational scheme in order to 
facilitate cross-Service occupational comparisons.  The Primary Occupation 
Code indicates the occupation for which the Service member has been trained or 
the most significant skill held by the individual.170      
Months spent in DEP is included in both the first-term attrition and the 
retention models, as previous studies suggest participation in DEP affects 
enlistees’ adjustment to the military lifestyle, thereby resulting in lower attrition 
and higher retention rates.  Finally, a moral waiver variable is created and used 
to control for the effect of a moral waiver on the success of an enlistee.171   
                                            
170 Military Entrance Processing Command (MEPCOM) Coding and Data Elements 
Description, January 1993, provided by Defense Manpower Data Center, Monterey, California. 
171 Incidents that require moral waivers include traffic violations, misdemeanors, felonies, 
and previous history of drug and/or alcohol abuse. 
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D. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 
1. Descriptive Statistics for Enlistees in All Services 
Table 5 provides variable means for all observations in the data set, by 
citizenship category.  In addition, the race-ethnic categories are further 
subdivided to show six specific ethnicity categories of interest, plus categories for 
other and unknown ethnicities.172  Noteworthy differences exist between the two 
citizenship groups for the race-ethnicity and ethnicity categories, and for the rates 
of first-term attrition, retention beyond the first term, and promotion to E-4 
(dependent variables).  The service with the largest proportion of noncitizens is 
the Navy; the Marine Corps has the smallest proportion.  Thirty-five percent of all 
noncitizens are in the Navy, while 18 percent are in the Marine Corps.      
Noncitizens have an average first-term attrition rate that is 9 percentage 
points lower than the average rate for citizens, and the average rate of retention 
beyond the first term is 10 percentage points higher for noncitizens than for 
citizens.  The average rate of promotion to E-4 is nearly 2 percentage points 
higher for noncitizens.   
Country of origin is not included in the data file, and specific ethnicity 
categories are provided for only those individuals who describe themselves as 
Latino, Asian/Pacific Islander, or Native American.  The ‘other’ category of 
ethnicity contains the largest proportion of observations for all services.  This 
group includes all those individuals who do not describe themselves as Latino, 
Native American, or Asian/Pacific Islander.  Individuals who consider themselves 
to be of African and European heritage would be included in this category.   
Latinos comprise almost 23 percent of all noncitizens in the data set.  Of 
all members of the Latino group, 10 percent are Mexican.  In contrast, only about 
8 percent of all citizens in the data set describe themselves as Latino, with only 3 
percent described as Mexican.  Similarly, the proportion of Filipinos, Pacific 
Islanders, and all other Asians in the noncitizen category is substantially higher 
than in the citizen category.  Nearly 8 percent of noncitizens are Filipinos, while 
                                            
172 Race-ethnic categories and ethnicity categories are self-described by enlistees.  
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less than 1 percent of citizens are members of this group.  Asians and Pacific 
Islanders (APIs) other than Filipinos comprise nearly 9 percent of all noncitizens, 
while just over 1 percent of citizens are categorized as such. 
Appendix D provides information on the total number of noncitizens for all 
services, as well as the number of noncitizens for each branch of the services.  
The number of noncitizens in each race-ethnicity and ethnicity category is also 
shown. 
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Table 5. Mean Characteristics of Noncitizen and Citizen Enlistees in All Services 




2. Descriptive Statistics for Army Enlistees 
Table 6 provides variable mean values for all Army observations in the 
data set.  The attrition rate for noncitizens is 7 percent lower than for noncitizens.  
The retention rate and promotion rate for the noncitizen group are 6 percent 
higher and 3 percent higher, respectively.   
Noncitizens comprise 3.1 percent of all Army recruits.  The ethnicity of 
nearly 66 percent of all noncitizens is categorized as ‘other’ or ‘unknown’.  Almost 
22 percent of noncitizens are Latinos, while less than 7 percent of citizens 
describe themselves as Latinos.  Mexican is the largest single ethnicity category 
within the Latino grouping, with almost 9 percent of all noncitizens in the Mexican 
category.   
Asians and Pacific Islanders comprise nearly 12 percent of all noncitizens, 
while less than 2 percent of citizens are APIs.  Filipino is the largest single 
ethnicity category within the API grouping, with almost 4 percent of all 
noncitizens in the Filipino category.    
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3. Descriptive Statistics for Navy Enlistees 
Table 7 provides variable mean values for all Navy observations in the 
data set.  The attrition rate for noncitizens is significantly lower than for citizens, 
and the retention rate is significantly higher for the noncitizen group.  The 
difference in attrition rates is 11 percentage points, while the retention rates differ 
by 12 percentage points.  The difference in promotion rates between the 2 
groups is small (0.4 percentage points), but statistically significant. 
Noncitizens comprise 3.3 percent of all observations.  The ethnicity of 
nearly 55 percent of all noncitizens is categorized as ‘other’ or ‘unknown’.  Almost 
22 percent of all noncitizens are Latino, while only 9 percent of citizens are in this 
category.  Similar to the Army, Mexican is the single largest ethnicity within the 
noncitizen Latino category, with nearly 9 percent of all noncitizens in this 
category. 
The Navy has the largest percentage of API enlistees of all services.  In 
the Navy sample data set, 20 percent of all noncitizens, and over 2 percent of all 
citizens are APIs.  The Navy also has the largest percentage of Filipino enlistees 
of all services.  Filipinos comprise over 13 percent of all noncitizens, and 1 
percent of all citizens in the data set.         
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4. Descriptive Statistics for Air Force Enlistees 
Table 8 provides variable means for all Air Force observations in the data 
set.  The attrition rate for noncitizens is nearly 8 percentage points lower, and the 
noncitizen retention rate is almost 15 percentage points higher than for citizens.  
The difference in the rate of promotion for the 2 groups is small (0.001), but 
statistically significant. 
The Air Force has the lowest proportion of noncitizens compared with the 
other services.  Noncitizens comprise only 1.7 percent of all observations.  The 
ethnicity of about 71 percent of these individuals is categorized as ‘other’ or 
‘unknown’.  The Air Force has the lowest percentage of Latino (and Mexican) 
noncitizens of all services.  The Air Force ranks second only to the Navy, 
however, in the proportion of noncitizens of Asian or Pacific Islander ethnicity.  
Nearly 14 percent of all noncitizens are API, with almost 8 percent of all 
noncitizens of Filipino ethnicity.       
57 
Table 8. Mean Characteristics of Air Force Noncitizen and Citizen Enlistees FY 




5. Descriptive Statistics for the Marine Corps Enlistees 
Table 9 provides variable mean values for all Marine Corps observations.  
The attrition rate for noncitizens is 9 percentage points lower than for citizens, 
and noncitizens have a retention rate 6 percentage points higher than citizens.  
Noncitizens also have a rate of promotion to E-4 that is nearly 5 percentage 
points higher than the rate for citizens. 
Noncitizens comprise 2 percent of all observations.  The ethnicity of nearly 
55 percent of these individuals is categorized as ‘other’ or ‘unknown’.  Of all 
services, the Marine Corps has the largest percentage of noncitizen and citizen 
Latinos.  Nearly 35 percent of noncitizens are from Latin America or the 
Caribbean, and over 10 percent of all citizens are of Latino ethnicity.  The single-
largest ethnicity group for noncitizen enlistees is Mexican (18.6 percent), with 6 
percent of all citizen enlistees of Mexican descent. 
Compared with other services, APIs comprise a relatively small 
percentage of enlistees in the Marine Corps sample data set.  The percentage of 
Filipino noncitizens is the smallest of all services, at 3 percent.   
59 
Table 9. Mean Characteristics of Marine Corps Noncitizen and Citizen Enlistees FY 




E. MODEL SPECIFICATIONS 
Separate models for the attrition, retention and promotion outcomes were 
estimated for each of the four services.  Since the personnel policies of each of 
the four services differ, separate service models provide a more reliable estimate 
of the effect of citizenship.   
1. Model of First-Term Attrition  
The attrition model developed for this study is based on models used in 
the studies discussed in the literature review (Section 1:  Attrition).  Multivariate 
logit models are used to estimate the probability of attrition, where: 
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Characteristics that represent a substantial percentage of observations in 
the particular category, i.e., education, race-ethnicity, gender, etc., form the base 
case.  The base case for each service is:  citizen, male, HSDG, Caucasian, 
unmarried with no dependents, and without a moral waiver.  Table 10 lists the 
estimated effects of each independent variable, as compared with the base case, 
on the probability of first-term attrition.  The marginal effect of each variable may 
be calculated by comparing the probability of attrition for the base case with the 
probability of attrition when one variable in the base case is increased by one unit 
or from zero to one, and all other variables are held constant.    
2. Model of Retention Beyond First Term 
The specification of the retention model developed for this study is based 
on the models cited in the retention portion of the literature review (Section 2:  
Retention).  The sample data set for retention includes all enlistees, regardless of 
attrition status.  That is, the sample is not restricted to only those eligible for 
reenlistment.  One reason for not excluding those who suffer attrition from the  
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retention model is that an individual’s decision to leave clearly reflects a lack of 
interest in reenlistment.  Also, policy makers may analyze the success of the 
entire entry cohort of enlistees.  
The probability of retention is estimated using logit regression analysis, 
where:    
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The base case for each service is:  citizen, male, HSDG, Caucasian, 
unmarried with no dependents, without a moral waiver, in MOS 15 (personnel).  
Table 10 lists the estimated effects of each independent variable on the 
probability of retention beyond the first term.  The marginal effect of each variable 
is calculated as outlined in the previous section.  
3. Model of Promotion to E-4 
The promotion model developed for this study is based on the Cook and 
Quester model cited in the literature review.173  The sample includes only 
individuals who completed their first terms of enlistment.  The model estimates 
the probability of promotion to E-4 while an individual is on active duty, i.e., it is 
not specific to the first-term.  Since the data sample ends in Fiscal Year 2002, the 
data set is limited to Fiscal Year 1996 through 1998 cohorts to provide a reliable 




                                            
173 Cooke and Quester, “What Characterizes Successful Enlistees in the All-Volunteer 
Force:  A Study of Male Recruits in the U.S. Navy,” 238-251. 
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Logit models are used to predict the probability of promotion, where:      
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The base case for each service is:  citizen, male, HSDG, Caucasian, 
unmarried with no dependents, and without a moral waiver.  Table 10 lists the 
estimated effects of each independent variable on the probability of promotion to 
E-4.  The marginal effect of each variable is calculated as outlined in the attrition 
model section.  
F. ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
The variable for noncitizen is hypothesized to be associated with lower 
rates of attrition and higher rates of retention and promotion.  This hypothesis is 
based on the historical service of noncitizens in the military, as well as interviews 
conducted for this study.  Noncitizens and citizens alike view military service as a 
valuable opportunity to gain job training and experience, and a means to achieve 
advanced education.  For noncitizens, enlistment also provides a pathway for 
expedited naturalization.  The results of the 2004 CNA study by Hattiangadi, Lee 
and Quester174 is supportive of the hypothesis for noncitizen attrition.  The 
authors find the noncitizen variable in their models has a negative effect on boot-
camp and first-term attrition rates for Marine Corps enlistees. 
AFQT percentile is expected to be associated with lower rates of attrition 
and higher promotion rates.  Alternative diploma status (GED, etc.) is predicted 
to be associated with higher rates of attrition and lower retention and promotion 
rates, compared with HSDG.  The results of a 2001 CNA study by Quester and 
Kimble175 suggest higher AFQT scores and HSDG have negative effects on 
                                            
174 Hattiangadi, Lee and Quester, “Recruiting Hispanics:  The Marine Corps Experience 
Final Report.”   
175 Quester and Kimble, “Final Report: Street-to-Fleet Study, Volume I: Street-to-Fleet for the 
Enlisted Force.”   
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attrition rates for Marine Corps enlistees.  In a separate study by Cooke and 
Quester,176 high AFQT scores and HSDG are predictors of lower attrition rates, 
as well as higher rates of retention and promotion to E-4.  These findings are 
consistent with the notion that attainment of a high school diploma signals an 
individual’s ability to fulfill commitments.  Since AFQT is often treated as a 
measure of cognitive ability, a higher test score is consistent with a higher 
probability of first-term contract completion.          
In contrast to the retention findings of the Cooke and Quester study, a 
1991 study by Quester and Adedeji177 finds that Marines in the top two AFQT 
categories have lower reenlistment rates. The difference between these studies 
is that Cooke and Quester analyze retention for all Navy enlistees, whereas 
Quester and Adedeji include only those enlistees who are eligible for 
reenlistment.  Like Cooke and Quester, all recruits in this study are included in 
the retention sample.  Thus, higher retention rates are expected for individuals 
with higher AFQT, and for HSDG recruits. 
The hypothesized effects of some college education and completion of 
college are indeterminate.  None of the reviewed studies included either of these 
variables in the models.  In addition, the number of observations for these two 
categories is relatively small.  Therefore, it is difficult to predict their effect on 
attrition, retention, and promotion rates.  These categories are included in the 
study to determine their predictive effect on measures of success.   
Females are expected to be associated with higher attrition rates based 
on the literature.  The findings of Hattiangadi, Lee and Quester178 indicate 
women have higher attrition rates than men in the Marine Corps.  Women are 
hypothesized to have a positive effect on retention, based on the findings of 
                                            
176 Cooke and Quester, “What Characterizes Successful Enlistees in the All-Volunteer 
Force:  A Study of Male Recruits in the U.S. Navy.”  
177 Quester and Adedeji, “Reenlisting in the Marine Corps: The Impact of Bonuses, Grade, 
and Dependency Status.”  
178 Hattiangadi, Lee and Quester, “Recruiting Hispanics:  The Marine Corps Experience 
Final Report.”   
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Quester and Adedeji179 in their 1991 study of Marine Corps enlistees.  The 
reviewed literature did not contain studies with predicted rates of promotion to E-
4 for women.  Since a variety of confounding sociological and economic factors 
may impact the promotion of junior enlisted women, the hypothesis for this 
variable is indeterminate.     
Enlistees with dependents and married enlistees (a subset of enlistees 
with dependents) often have greater financial responsibilities than do their single 
counterparts with no dependents.  For this reason, they may be more inclined to 
continue serving in the military for reasons of job security and benefits.  Based on 
this assumption, these variables are expected to be associated with lower 
attrition and higher retention rates.  The results of a study by Quester and 
Adedeji suggest married Marines have a higher probability of reenlistment.180         
Enlistees with dependents and married enlistees have financial incentives 
to advance in their military occupational fields.  Therefore, their performance 
levels will tend to be higher.  The hypothesized effect of these two variables on 
promotion is positive.  
The predicted effect of age on attrition, retention, and promotion is 
indeterminate.  None of the studies included in the literature review contained 
this variable. However, it is included in all three models in this study to ascertain 
its estimated effect on measures of success.   
Many of the models reviewed contain variables for race-ethnicity.  
Specifically, race-ethnicity variables for Blacks and Latinos are included in Cooke 
and Quester’s 1992 study of Navy enlistees.181  In their results, both variables 
were associated with higher rates of success, i.e., lower first-term attrition rates,  
                                            
179 Quester and Adedeji, “Reenlisting in the Marine Corps: The Impact of Bonuses, Grade, 
and Dependency Status.”   
180 Ibid. 
181 Cooke and Quester, “What Characterizes Successful Enlistees in the All-Volunteer 
Force:  A Study of Male Recruits in the U.S. Navy.”   
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higher rates of retention beyond the first term, and higher rates of promotion to E-
4.  These findings may be related to the lower overall socioeconomic status of 
individuals in these categories.   
The selected literature review does not contain any studies with variables 
for the Asian/Pacific Islander race-ethnicity variable.  The literature review of the 
history of noncitizens in the military, and the interviews conducted with 
noncitizens suggest Asian/Pacific Islanders may have higher rates of success in 
the military than Caucasians.  For this reason, the Asian/Pacific Islander variable 
is hypothesized to be associated with lower attrition rates and higher rates of 
retention and promotion.      
No variable for the race-ethnicity category of Native American is found in 
the literature review of enlistment studies.  Additionally, the relative number of 
Native American recruits is small.  For this reason, the hypotheses for attrition, 
retention, and promotion are indeterminate.     
To determine the effect of a moral waiver on the success of an enlistee a 
variable for this category is included in all three models.  A moral waiver may 
indicate incompatibility with military lifestyle and difficulty with authority.  
Therefore, this variable is hypothesized to be associated with higher rates of 
attrition and lower rates of retention and promotion.    
Local (state) unemployment rates are included in the retention models.  
Higher unemployment rates may correlate with higher rates of retention due to a 
lack of opportunities for enlistees in the civilian employment sector.  The results 
of the 1991 study by Quester and Adedji182 suggest an increase in the 
unemployment rate is associated with higher retention rates.  Thus, higher 
unemployment rates are hypothesized to have a positive impact on retention.    
The results of previous studies indicate participation in DEP is associated 
with lower attrition rates and higher rates of retention.  Quester and Kimble183 
                                            
182 Quester and Adedeji, “Reenlisting in the Marine Corps: The Impact of Bonuses, Grade, 
and Dependency Status.”    
183 Quester and Kimble, “Final Report: Street-to-Fleet Study, Volume I: Street-to-Fleet for the 
Enlisted Force.”    
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found lower predicted attrition rates for DEP participants.  The results of Cooke 
and Quester’s study184 suggest DEP participation positively affects the 
probability of success in the Navy.  Therefore, the variable for months in DEP is 
expected to be associated with lower rates of attrition and higher rates of 
retention.  
Since each MOS code used in the retention model for this study includes 
numerous occupations, it is difficult to predict the effect of each code on 
retention.  Therefore, the hypothesized association between MOS codes and 
retention is indeterminate.  Table 10 provides a summary of the hypothesized 
effects of each variable on the models.      
 
Table 10. Estimated Effects of Explanatory Variables 
 
A ‘-‘ or ‘+’ sign indicates the expected effect of the independent variable on the predicted 
value of the dependent variable.  A ‘?’ indicates the expected effect of the independent variable is 
unknown.  
Variable Names Estimated Effects 
 Attrition Retention Promotion  
NONCITIZEN - + + 
AFQTPERC - ? + 
FEMALE + + ? 
SOMCOLL ? ? ? 
COLLGRAD ? ? ? 
ALTGRAD + - - 
BLACK - + + 
LATINO - + + 
NATAM ? ? ? 
API - + + 
MARRIED - + + 
DEPENDENT - + + 
MORWAIVER + - - 
AGE ? ? ? 
MONDEP - + Not Included 
UNEMPLOYMENT Not Included + Not Included 




                                            
184 Cooke and Quester, “What Characterizes Successful Enlistees in the All-Volunteer 
Force:  A Study of Male Recruits in the U.S. Navy.”  
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G. RESULTS   
1. First-Term Attrition  
The results of the first-term attrition models for all services are shown in 
Table 11.  Most coefficients are significant at the 1-percent level.  Negative 
coefficients indicate a lower predicted probability of attrition, while positive 
coefficients indicate a higher predicted probability of attrition.  The sample size 
for each service, as well as R-square and likelihood ratios are shown.  The 
complete analysis of maximum likelihood estimates for each service is provided 
in Appendix E.       
 





Variable Name Army Navy Air Force Marine Corps 
NONCITIZEN -0.5649 -0.6838 -0.4217 -0.5122 
AFQTPERC -0.0078 -0.0089 -0.0126 -0.0111 
FEMALE 0.5996 0.2336 0.1990 0.7315 
SOMCOLL -0.2281 -0.3831 -0.2120 -0.2605 
COLLGRAD -0.4186 -0.2932 0.2191 -0.6115 
ALTGRAD 0.6874 0.6764 0.4561 0.6400 
BLACK -0.3369 -0.1096 -0.2609 -0.0272b 
LATINO -0.3795 -0.1641 -0.4082 -0.3471 
NATAM 0.0137* 0.0425* 0.2440 0.0059* 
API -0.5600 -0.6387 -0.5518 -0.4516 
UNKNRACE -0.3408 -0.1603 -0.3355 -0.1880 
MARRIED -0.7998 -0.5771 -0.3065 -0.9304 
DEPENDENT -0.2867 -0.5438 -0.7391 -0.4899 
MORWAIVER 0.1430 0.2875 0.1395 0.2235 
AGE 0.0725 0.0431 0.0295 0.0908 
MONDEP -0.0371 -0.0471 -0.0360 -0.0439 
INTERCEPT -0.6656 -0.1836 0.2764 -1.1096 
Sample Size 223,631 367,536 253,671 222,373 
R-Square 0.1064 0.1263 0.1308 0.1498 
Likelihood Ratio 25,149 49,635 35,551 36,077 
Pr > Chi-Square <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
All variables significant at the .01 level except those designated by *(not significant),  
or b(significant at .10 level).  
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The marginal effects for the variables included in the logistic regression 
model are shown in Table 12.  The probability of attrition for the base case, 
P(BASE CASE), in each service is the last entry in the table.   
 
Table 12. Marginal Effects for Attrition Models 
 
 Army Navy Air Force Marine Corps 
  NONCIT -0.140 -0.160 -0.101 -0.122 
  CITIZEN  base  base  base  base 
     
  AFQTPERC -0.020 -0.022 -0.031 -0.027 
     
  FEMALE  0.141  0.058  0.050  0.179 
  MALE  base  base  base  base 
     
  SOMCOLL -0.057 -0.093 -0.052 -0.064 
  COLLGRAD -0.104 -0.072 -0.055 -0.144 
  ALTGRAD  0.160  0.166  0.113  0.158 
  HSDG  base  base  base  base 
     
  BLACK -0.084 -0.027 -0.064  0.007b 
  LATINO -0.095 -0.040 -0.098 -0.084 
  NATAM  n.s.  n.s.  0.006  n.s. 
  API -0.139 -0.150 -0.131 -0.109 
  UNKNRACE -0.085 -0.040 -0.081 -0.046 
  CAUCASIAN  base  base  base  base 
     
  MARRIED -0.195 -0.137 -0.075 -0.209 
  SINGLE  base  base  base  base 
     
  DEPENDENT -0.072 -0.129 -0.171 -0.117 
  NO DEPENDENT  base  base  base  base 
  MORWAIVER  0.035  0.072  0.035  0.011 
     
  NO MORWAIVER  base  base  base  base 
     
  AGE  0.018  0.004  0.007  0.023 
     
  MONDEP -0.012 -0.018 -0.009 -0.011 
  P(BASE CASE)  0.538  0.461  0.459  0.462 
 
All variables significant at the .01 level except those designated by b(significant at .10 level).  
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As hypothesized, the variable for noncitizen is associated with significantly 
lower predicted attrition rates in all four services.  Noncitizens have predicted 
attrition rates that range from 16 percentage points lower (Navy) to 10 
percentage points lower (Air Force) than do citizens.  The marginal effect for 
noncitizens in the Marine Corps is -12 percentage points, indicating noncitizen 
Marines have estimated first-term attrition rates that are 12 percentage points 
lower than that of citizen enlistees.  This effect is somewhat higher than the effect 
reported in Hattiangadi, Lee and Quester’s 2004 CNA study,185 which found that 
noncitizen Marines have estimated first-term attrition rates that are 8 percentage 
points lower than citizen Marines.     
Two variables for which the hypotheses are indeterminate are associated 
with lower rates of predicted attrition.  The coefficients for the ‘some college’ and 
‘college graduate’ variables are both negative and significant for all services, 
suggesting formal education beyond the high school level decreases the 
likelihood of attrition.   
The hypotheses for the Native American and age variables are also 
indeterminate.  The coefficient for Native American is only significant in the Air 
Force model, where it has a small, positive value.  The variable for age is 
significant and positive for all services.  This suggests each additional year of 
age over the base case is associated with a higher predicted probability of 
attrition. 
In addition to the marginal effects of the variables for noncitizen, some 
college, and college graduate, the following variables are associated with lower 
estimated attrition rates: higher AFQT percentile, male, Black, Latino, API, 
married, dependents, and months in DEP.    
2. Retention Beyond First Term 
The results of the retention models for all services are shown in Table 13.  
Most coefficients are significant at the 1-percent level.  Negative coefficients 
indicate a lower predicted probability of attrition, while positive coefficients 
                                            
185 Hattiangadi, Lee and Quester, “Recruiting Hispanics:  The Marine Corps Experience 
Final Report.”    
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indicate a higher predicted probability of attrition.  The sample size for each 
service, as well as R-square and likelihood ratios are shown.  The complete 
analysis of maximum likelihood estimates for each service is provided in 
Appendix F.         
 
Table 13. Logit Regression Estimates for Retention Models 
 
Variable Name Army Navy Air Force Marine Corps 
NONCITIZEN 0.3341 0.3994 -0.0305* 0.2807 
AFQTPERC 0.0035 0.0141 -0.0003* 0.0022 
FEMALE -0.3731 -0.0801 0.0608 -0.1355 
SOMCOLL 0.0152* -0.0063* 0.1069b 0.0122* 
COLLGRAD 0.0473* -0.2218 -0.1486 -0.2183 
ALTGRAD -0.4576 -0.3291 -0.1072a -0.0277* 
BLACK 0.4049 0.3745 0.3273 0.3697 
LATINO 0.1917 0.0964 0.0636 0.1265 
NATAM 0.0401* 0.1423 -0.1091* 0.0832* 
API 0.3741 0.5964 0.3390 0.3080 
UNKNRACE 0.3013 0.3506 0.2868 0.2474 
MARRIED 0.9455 0.2168 -0.1259 0.2801 
DEPENDENT 0.4473 0.5259 0.8222 0.4177 
MORWAIVER -0.0777 -0.1251 -0.0196* -0.3092 
AGE -0.0711 -0.0139 -0.0281 -0.0284 
MONDEP 0.0328 0.0236 0.0224 0.0166 
UNEMP 0.0738 0.0008* 0.1036 0.0473 
MOS10 -0.2813 -0.9133 -0.2736 -0.4548 
MOS11 -0.2556 0.0644 -0.2167 0.6820 
MOS12 -0.3277 -0.2981 0.0811 -0.0740 
MOS13 -0.1977 0.6667 -0.2748 3.4859* 
MOS14 0.0446* 0.4008 -0.3858 0.1170 
MOS16 -0.4059 -0.2673 -0.2935 -0.1010 
MOS17 -0.4862 -0.0779 -0.4966 -0.4236 
MOS18 -0.2242 -0.2963 -0.6394 -0.4425 
MOS19 -3.2248* -3.7313* -3.7656* -2.4957* 
Intercept -0.4212 -0.9528 -0.2589 -0.8682 
Sample Size 175,062 277,747 191,894 167,351 
R-Square 0.1822 0.2767 0.2676 0.1681 
Likelihood Ratio 35,204 89,983 59,755 30,793 
Pr > Chi-Square <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
 
All variables significant at the .01 level except those designated by *(not significant),   
   a(significant at .05 level), or b(significant at .10 level).  
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The marginal effects for the variables included in the logistic regression 
model are shown in Table 14.  The probability of retention for the base case, 
P(BASE CASE), in each service is the last entry in the table.   
 
Table 14. Marginal Effects for Retention Models 
 
 Army Navy  Air Force Marine Corps 
  NONCIT  0.070  0.099  n.s.   0.060 
  CITIZEN  base  base  base  base 
     
  AFQTPERC  0.007  0.035  n.s.  0.005 
     
  FEMALE -0.066  -0.019b   0.014   -0.026 
  MALE  base  base  base  base 
     
  SOMCOLL  n.s.    n.s.   0.027b  n.s. 
  COLLGRAD  n.s.  -0.053 -0.036 -0.042 
  ALTGRAD -0.080   -0.078  -0.026a  n.s. 
  HSDG  base  base  base  base 
     
  BLACK  0.086   0.093  0.082  0.080b 
  LATINO  0.040  0.024  0.016  0.026 
  NATAM  n.s.  0.035  n.s.  n.s. 
  API  0.078  0.148  0.085  0.066 
  UNKNRACE  0.066  0.067  0.076  0.046 
  CAUCASIAN  base  base   base  base 
     
  MARRIED  0.216  0.054  0.031  0.059 
  SINGLE  base  base  base  base 
     
  DEPENDENT  0.096  0.131  0.200  0.091 
   base  base  base 
  MORWAIVER -0.015  0.030  n.s. -0.057 
  NO MORWAIVER  base  base  base  base 
     
  AGE -0.014   -0.003 -0.007 -0.006 
     
  MONDEP 0.006            0.006 n.s.  0.006     
     
  UNEMP 0.008            n.s.  0.026  0.010 
     
  MOS10 -0.051 -0.197 -0.066 -0.082 
  MOS11 -0.047  0.016 -0.052  0.153 
  MOS12 -0.059 -0.071  0.021 -0.015 
  MOS13 -0.037  0.165 -0.066  n.s. 
  MOS14  n.s.  0.100 -0.092  0.023 
  MOS15  base  base  base  base 
  MOS16 -0.068 -0.064 -0.070 -0.020 
  MOS17 -0.084 -0.018 -0.116 -0.077 
  MOS18 -0.042 -0.070 -0.148 -0.080 
  MOS19  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s. 
     
  P(BASE CASE)  0.264  0.428  0.446  0.276 
All variables significant at the .01 level except those designated by 
 a(significant at .05 level), or b(significant at .10 level).  
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As hypothesized, the variable for noncitizen is associated with significantly 
higher predicted retention rates.  This is true for all services except the Air Force.  
In the civilian workforce, the predicted wage gap between immigrant and natives 
does not decrease measurably during an immigrant’s working life.186  In addition, 
there is evidence to suggest the sheepskin effect of a high school diploma is less 
for noncitizens than citizens.187  All branches of the armed forces offer equal pay 
to their members, regardless of citizenship status.  For this reason, noncitizen 
enlistees may view military service as a way to obtain equitable pay for their 
work.   
Noncitizens have estimated retention rates ranging from 10 percentage 
points higher (Navy) to 6 percentage points higher (Marine Corps) than do 
citizens.  The noncitizen variable is not significant in the Air Force model.  This 
finding may be explained by the relatively low percentage of noncitizens in the Air 
Force. 
The hypothesized effects of the variables for some college, college 
graduate, Native American, and age are all indeterminate.  The coefficient for 
some college is significant in only the Navy model, where it is associated with a 
higher predicted rate of retention.  The coefficient for college graduate is negative 
and significant in all but the Army model, indicating that attainment of a 
bachelor’s degree is associated with a lower estimated probability of retention in 
the Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps.  The coefficient for the variable Native 
American is only significant in the Navy model, where it is positive, indicating a 
higher estimated effect on retention.  The coefficient for the age variable is 
significant and negative for all services.  This suggests each additional year of 
age over the base case is associated with a lower predicted probability of 
retention. 
 
                                            
186 George J. Borjas, “The Economic Progress of Immigrants,” 5. 
187 Betts and Lofstrom, “The Educational Attainment of Immigrants,” 109. 
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The sign of the variable for female is negative and significant in all 
services except the Air Force.  This finding is contrary to the stated hypothesis, 
and suggests that women have lower predicted rates of retention in all but the Air 
Force.   
The sign of the variable for moral waiver is positive and significant for the 
Navy model, which differs from the hypothesis.  The finding is interesting, in that 
it indicates existence of a moral waiver is associated with a higher predicted 
probability of retention in the Navy.  Variables other than noncitizen that are 
associated with higher estimated retention rates are:  higher AFQT percentile, 
male gender, Black, Latino, API, higher unemployment rate, married, 
dependents, and months in DEP.      
3. Promotion to E-4  
The results of the promotion models for all services are shown in Table 
15.  The goodness-of-fit of the promotion models is much poorer than that of the 
previous models for attrition and retention.  This may be because the sample 
data is restricted to three cohort files.  In addition, the lack of a time-specific 
promotion variable may be a consideration.   
To provide more reliable estimates, the sample includes only those 
individuals who did not suffer attrition in the first term.  That is, only those recruits 
who survived to the end of their first terms are included.188  The sample size for 
each service, as well as R-square and Likelihood Ratios are shown.  The 
complete analysis of maximum likelihood estimates for each service is provided 








                                            
188 A separate analysis was performed using a sample that includes the individuals who 
suffered first-term attrition.  The marginal effect of the noncitizen variable is substantially larger in 
this model.  However, the analysis may contain a self-selection bias due to the higher retention 
rate of noncitizens.  The results of this analysis are provided in Appendix H. 
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Table 15. Logit Regression Estimates for Promotion Models 
 
Variable Name Army Navy Air Force Marine Corps 
NONCITIZEN 0.5665 0.3468 0.4961 0.4783 
AFQTPERC 0.0090 0.0229 0.0087 0.0128 
FEMALE -0.1889 -0.1202 0.3130 0.1594 
SOMCOLL 0.1821* 0.6433 0.1677* 0.6413a 
COLLGRAD 2.5822 0.5390 0.8555 -0.4394 
ALTGRAD -0.7893 -0.6291 0.0069* -0.4643 
BLACK 0.1581 -0.2932 -0.2867 -0.1995 
LATINO 0.3139 0.0283* -0.1307b 0.0310* 
NATAM -0.2262* -0.1341* -0.4205b -0.2337a 
API 0.6103 0.3363 0.2936a 0.1643b 
UNKNRACE 0.2708* 0.0118* 0.1763* -0.0460* 
MARRIED 0.9033 0.3829 0.0063* -0.0429* 
DEPENDENT 0.1277 0.1970 0.3149 0. 1261 
MORWAIVER -0.0814* -0.2807 -0.1006b -0.2975 
AGE -0.0095* 0.0108b 0.0829b 0.0258 
Intercept 0.3905 0.4659 0.4943 0.1681 
Sample Size 44,715 65,957 56,717 48,023 
R-Square 0.0346 0.0364 0.0093 0.0179 
Likelihood Ratio 1,575 2,445 532 868 
Pr > Chi-Square <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
All variables significant at the .01 level except those designated by *(not significant),   
    a(significant at .05 level), or b(significant at .10 level). 
 
The marginal effects for the variables included in the logistic regression 
model are shown in Table 16.  The probability of promotion for the base case, 












Table 16. Marginal Effects for Promotion to E-4 
 
 Army Navy  Air Force Marine Corps 
  NONCIT  0.060  0.030  0.024  0.065 
  CITIZEN  base  base  base  base 
     
  AFQTPERC  0.011  0.020  0.005  0.019 
     
  FEMALE -0.025  -0.012  0.016  0.024 
  MALE          base  base  base  base 
     
  SOMCOLL  n.s. 0.048   n.s.   0.082a 
     
  COLLGRAD  0.134  0.042  0.035  -0.078 
  ALTGRAD -0.128  -0.077  n.s.   -0.084  
  HSDG        base  base  base  base 
     
  BLACK  0.018   -0.032  -0.019    -0.033         
  LATINO  0.035  n.s.   -0.008b   n.s.         
  NATAM  n.s.  n.s.  -0.030b       -0.040a    
  API  0.061  0.028   0.015a  0.025b 
  UNKNRACE  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s. 
  CAUCASIAN  base  base  base  base 
     
  MARRIED  0.081  0.032  n.s.  n.s. 
  SINGLE  base  base  base  base 
     
  DEPENDENT  0.015  0.017  0.016  0.019 
  NO DEPENDENT  base  base  base  base 
     
  MORWAIVER -0.010*  -0.030  -0.006b    -0.051  
  NO MORWAIVER    base  base  base   base 
       
  AGE  n.s.  0.001b  0.004b  0.004     
     
  P(BASE CASE)  0.853  0.891  0.936  0.802 
  
   All variables significant at the .01 level except those designated by *(not significant),   
   a(significant at .05 level), or b(significant at .10 level).  
 
As hypothesized, the variable for noncitizen is associated with significantly 
higher predicted rates of promotion to E-4 for all services.  For several reasons, 
noncitizens may be more highly motivated to serve.  This higher motivation may 
correspond with higher levels of job performance, which would affect promotion 
rates.  From an economic perspective, service in the military allows immigrants a 
means to attain equitable pay for their labor efforts. It also affords them the 
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opportunity to increase their human capital.  Immigrants who are motivated to 
complete their first enlistment contracts for these reasons might also be more 
likely to have high job performance levels and higher corresponding promotion 
levels.  A last factor, assimilation, may play a role in noncitizens’ motivation to 
perform at higher levels than the average enlistee.           
Noncitizens have a significantly higher estimated probability of promotion 
to E-4 in all four services.  Their predicted promotion rates range from 6.5 
percentage points higher (Marine Corps) to 2.4 percentage points higher (Air 
Force) than citizens.  Other variables that have a positive effect on the predicted 
promotion rate are:  higher AFQT percentile, male gender, Latino (except Air 
Force), API, married, and dependents.    
The hypothesized effects of the following variables are indeterminate:  
some college, college graduate, female, Native American, and age.  The 
coefficient for some college is significant and positive for Navy and Marine Corps 
models, and not significant for the Army and Air Force models.  The coefficient 
for college graduate is significant and positive for Army, Navy and Air Force 
models.  These findings suggest education beyond the high school level is 
associated with higher predicted probabilities of promotion to E-4.  The Marine 
Corps model is the exception, as the coefficient for college graduate is significant 
and negative.     
The results for the female variable are mixed for the 4 services.  The 
coefficient is negative and significant for the Army and Navy models, and positive 
and significant for the Air Force and Marine Corps models.  The coefficient for 
the Native American variable is negative and significant for the Air Force and 
Marine Corps models, and not significant for the Army and Navy models.  The 
coefficient for age is positive and significant for the Navy, Air Force and Marine 
Corps models, indicating a greater likelihood of promotion to E-4 with each 
additional year of age over the base case.  The coefficient for age is not 
significant for the Army.    
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The hypothesized effect of the Black race-ethnic variable is positive.  The 
actual coefficients for the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, however, are 
negative and significant, indicating Black enlistees have a lower predicted 
probability of promotion for these three services. 
The only branch of the armed forces for which the coefficient for the Latino 
variable is negative and significant is the Air Force.  This suggests Latinos have 
a lower predicted probability of promotion to E-4 in this service.  Conversely, 
Latinos have a higher estimated probability of promotion in the Army, Navy, and 
Marine Corps, as hypothesized. 
4. Summary of Results 
The noncitizen variable has a significant effect on the predicted measures 
of success for all services.189  Predicted first-term attrition rates are significantly 
lower for noncitizens, and predicted retention beyond the first term and promotion 
to E-4 are significantly higher for noncitizens.  These findings indicate separate 
models for noncitizens may be of value, as they could provide a more 
comprehensive analysis of the effect of demographic and other variables on the 
success of noncitizens.   
                                            
189 Air Force retention is the only model in which the noncitizen variable is not significant.   
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Frequently on the return of a United States vessel from a cruise, 
about the only (U.S.) nationality she has is in her officers and the 
flag flying at her peak.190 
A. SUMMARY  
Noncitizens have provided valuable service to the armed forces since the 
nation’s founding.191  The purpose of this study is to offer a more complete 
picture of this important minority group in the military.  A historical review of 
noncitizens’ service, an exploration of their motivations to serve, and statistical 
analyses of the success of recent noncitizen enlistees are presented to facilitate 
a better understanding of the contributions these individuals have made to the 
United States. 
1. Background 
The history of noncitizen service has corresponded roughly to the nation’s 
history of immigration and naturalization policy.  Over the course of more than 
two centuries, the relationship of citizenship for service has endured, with 
enlistment acting as both an opportunity and an obligation.192  Military service 
has offered immigrants in the U.S. a way of being assimilated into American 
culture and society.  At the same time, it has provided the country with a way to 
meet its military manpower needs, especially during times of crisis.   
The two largest source countries for immigrants to the United States today 
are Mexico and the Philippines.  These two countries are also the largest 
resource for noncitizen military members, with Latin America and the Caribbean  
                                            
190 Remark made by an officer in 1873.  In 1883, the USS Ashuelot was sunk in the China 
Sea.  It was discovered that 92 of the 111 crew members were foreign born.  Source:  James H. 
Hayes, “The Evolution of Armed Forces Enlisted Personnel Management Policies:  Executive 
Summary,” N-1893-AF, The Rand Corporation, July 1982: 75. 
191 In 1997, it was reported that over 20 percent of all Medal of Honor recipients have been 
immigrants, and immigrant medal recipients have served in every war since the medal was 
inaugurated.  Source:  American Immigration Law Foundation, Immigration Policy Report:  
Immigrants Active and Honored in the Armed Forces, 
http://www.ailf.org/ipc/policy_reports_1997_pr9731.htm, accessed January 2004. 
192 James B. Jacobs, and Leslie Anne Hayes, “Aliens in the U.S. Armed Forces,” 199.  
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contributing the greatest number of immigrants from any one region of the 
world.193  As of September 2003, noncitizens comprised more than 2 percent, or 
nearly 33,000, of the U.S. military’s active-duty enlisted force.194      
Military enlistment may provide noncitizens with opportunities to improve 
their economic positions and gain the job training and experience they value so 
highly.  Economic evidence suggests the difference in wages between 
immigrants and native-born individuals does not decrease measurably during the 
course of immigrants’ working lives.195  In addition, the “sheepskin effect” of a 
high school diploma is weaker for immigrants than for citizens.  Although foreign-
born individuals have roughly the same rates of college graduation and workforce 
participation as do U.S.-born citizens, they have a higher probability of working in 
less desirable occupations and earning lower salaries.196  All these economic 
factors may make military service a desirable option for young immigrants who 
seek stable employment with equitable pay and benefits.   
2. Interviews with Enlistees 
Interviews were conducted with ten enlistees who entered the military as 
noncitizens to gain a deeper understanding of the individuals who currently serve 
as noncitizen enlistees.  The overall impression gained from these interviews is 
that each of the enlistees felt his or her military service had been a worthwhile 
endeavor.  Since noncitizens are restricted to occupational specialties that do not 
require security clearances, several of the enlistees were initially unable to serve 
in their occupational areas of choice.  However, all the interviewees believed 
their training and experiences were meaningful.  Most of the individuals cited job 
stability and/or training as the prevailing reason for enlisting.  A few enlistees  
                                            
193 Calculations are based on data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center 
(DMDC), Monterey, California, Fiscal Year 1990-1998 enlistee cohorts, and on DMDC’s “Non-
U.S. Citizens on Active Duty as of February 2003.”  
194 Calculations are based on data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center, 
Monterey, California, “Citizenship Status as of September 2003.”  
195 George J. Borjas, “The Economic Progress of Immigrants,” in Issues in the Economics of 
Immigration, ed. George J. Borjas, 5 (Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press, 2000).  
196 Ruben G. Rumbaut, “Origins and Destinies:  Immigration to the United States Since 
World War II,” 612. 
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mentioned educational benefits and the opportunity for adventure as motivations.  
Only two interviewees specified eligibility for expedited citizenship as an 
important consideration.    
3. Statistical Analyses 
To examine objectively the performance of noncitizen enlistees, statistical 
analyses of three specific measures of success were performed on enlisted 
cohort data for Fiscal Years 1990 – 1998.197  The predicted rates of first-term 
attrition, retention beyond the first-term of enlistment, and promotion to E-4 were 
determined for each of the four services.  Noncitizens were found to have 
significantly lower predicted first-term attrition rates than do citizens in the 
enlisted force.  Noncitizens also tend to have significantly higher estimated rates 
of retention beyond the first-term of enlistment and higher rates of promotion to 
the E-4 pay-grade than do citizen enlistees.   
B. CONCLUSIONS 
Noncitizen enlistees have provided important service to the U.S. 
throughout its history, and especially during wartime.  In this respect, noncitizens 
are not unlike other minority groups that have served in the military throughout 
U.S. history.  They, like African-Americans who served before the military was 
integrated and women who served in limited capacities before warfare specialties 
became more widely available to them, provide a beneficial source of manpower 
to assist the military on an as-needed basis.  In exchange for their service, 
noncitizens in the armed forces have been eligible for naturalization more quickly 
than have civilian immigrants throughout history.  The concept of citizenship-for-
service is a well-established precedent by which immigrants have gained political 
and social legitimacy.198           
In addition to the promise of citizenship, the motivations that cause 
immigrants to enlist also drive these individuals to succeed in the military.  Their 
success may be because they have more to gain by enlisting than do individuals 
succeed, they stand the chance to gain economic born in the U.S.  If they                                             
197 Fiscal Years 1996-1998 enlistee cohort data was used in the logit regression analysis of 
predicted promotion to E-4.  
198 James B. Jacobs, and Leslie Anne Hayes, “Aliens in the U.S. Armed Forces,” 201.  
81 
benefits that are in many cases more valuable to them than to their citizen 
counterparts.  They may also achieve the non-economic benefit of assimilation 
into the fabric of society.  Immigrant enlistees also have more to lose from 
unsuccessful enlistments, as their prospects for employment in the civilian sector 
are less appealing than the prospects of U.S.-born enlistees.  In addition, a less-
than-honorable discharge may worsen their employment prospects even further, 
and may limit their future prospects for naturalization.  
The results of the statistical analyses presented in this thesis suggest that 
noncitizens are largely successful, productive members of the armed forces who 
offer a valuable source of manpower to the military.  From the military’s 
perspective, noncitizens provide a ready source of high-performing manpower.  
They also fill important roles as influencers for the next generation of youth, as 
the noncitizen enlistees of today will be the parents, relatives, and counselors of 
tomorrow.       
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Policies 
Based on the data obtained from the Defense Manpower Data Center, 
information on noncitizen enlistees’ reported countries of origin is missing for a 
large percentage (over 31 percent) of noncitizens in the military.199  Therefore, 
recruiting commands for all four services should consider adding source country 
as a mandatory field in the administrative processing of noncitizen recruits.  This 
will allow for the more accurate tracking of information related to the performance 
of noncitizens.  
As noncitizen enlistees are motivated to serve and perform at significantly 
higher levels than do citizen enlistees, it may be worthwhile for all branches of 
the service to provide to this group more information on enlistment opportunities.  
While the Filipino community has a strong network of active-duty and retired 
military members who may offer advice to young individuals about enlistment 
options, most other immigrant ethnic communities do not have as strong a 
                                            
199 Defense Manpower Data Center, Monterey, California, “Non-U.S. Citizens on Active Duty 
as of February 2003.”  
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linkage to the U.S. military.  Thus, supplying bilingual recruiting materials for 
relatives and friends of potential noncitizen recruits should be considered.  The 
provision of additional knowledge about the military may allow both enlistees and 
members of their support network to feel more confident about the enlistment 
decision.  It will also facilitate the spread of information about military 
opportunities throughout the community.   
Since the ceiling on noncitizen enlistments is driven by security clearance 
requirements and there is a large potential pool of noncitizen recruits living in the 
United States, it may be beneficial to determine if any billets that are presently 
coded for security clearances may be declassified.  Nearly 289,000 documented 
immigrants under the age of 21 were admitted to the U.S. in the year 2002, with 
more than 100,000 of them between 16 and 20 years of age.200   
Another policy consideration could be the implementation of an 
immigration quota for qualified individuals who would agree to serve in the 
military for a specified period of time in exchange for citizenship.201  A program 
such as this could be modeled after the Philippines Enlistment Program that 
existed during the latter half of the twentieth century.  The Filipino enlistees who 
served in the U.S. Navy as participants in this program were highly successful,202 
and are now important influencers of today’s youth.  A separate but related 
recommendation is to consider offering highly qualified immigrant recruits 
occupational specialty guarantees.  Once the enlistee is naturalized, he or she 
would be guaranteed authorization to transfer into the desired career field.     
A last policy recommendation is to offer noncitizens unique reenlistment 
incentives.  The provision of expedited Permanent Resident Status for family 
members might be offered to immigrant service members who agree to continue 
                                            
200 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 
http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/IMM02yrbk/IMM2002.pdf, accessed January 
2004.  
201 James B. Jacobs and Leslie Anne Hayes, “Aliens in the U.S. Armed Forces,” 201.  
202 Luisito G. Maligat, “Study of the U.S. Navy’s Philippines Enlistment Program, 1981-1991,” 
Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2000, v.  
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on active duty.203  Such incentives could be extremely valuable to noncitizen 
service members, many of whom face waits in excess of ten years before family 
members can obtain green cards.   
2. Future Research  
Areas for further research could include qualitative and statistical analyses 
of specific ethnic categories of interest within the population of noncitizen 
enlistees, and within the civilian youth population at-large.  Researchers may 
focus on the largest immigrant ethnic group in the U.S. today:  Latinos.  In the 
year 2000, more than 40 percent of Latinos in the United States were foreign-
born, and nearly 75 percent of these individuals were noncitizens.204  A group of 
particular interest here is Mexicans, as they account for the largest number of 
noncitizen recruits.205   
D. FINAL THOUGHT 
The sentiments expressed by two recently naturalized enlistees from Haiti 
offer some insight into the motivations of noncitizen service members, and reflect 
the citizenship-for-service agreement that has been a part of military tradition 
since the nation’s founding.  A Navy petty officer who was interviewed at her 
naturalization ceremony in January 2004 remarked:  “I’m feeling great.  I’ve done 
something for America, and they’re doing something back to me.”206  An Army 
specialist who took part in a separate naturalization ceremony in March 2004 
said the following when asked about his enlistment decision:  “I believe in 
freedom. . . .  America is a country that has an open door to the world, and it is a 
privilege for me to be here to serve.”207   
 
                                            
203 Allen S. Kong, “Manning the Force Through Immigration:  Making the American Dream 
Work for the Armed Forces,” U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project (Carlisle 
Barracks, PA:  U.S. Army War College, 2001), 9-10. 
204 Anita U. Hattiangadi, Gary Lee and Aline O. Quester, “Recruiting Hispanics: The Marine 
Corps Experience Final Report”, Center for Naval Analyses, January 2004, 16.  
205 This statement is based on data for Fiscal Year 1990-1998 enlisted cohorts, provided by 
Defense Manpower Data Center, Monterey, California.  
206 Carrie Kahn, “Analysis:  Marines and Sailors Serving in the U.S. Military Become U.S. 
Citizens,” Weekend Edition, National Public Radio, February 1, 2004.    
207 Associated Press, “U.S. Soldiers Take Oath of Citizenship,” Dallas Morning News, March 
2, 2004.  
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APPENDIX A.  NON-U.S. CITIZENS ON ACTIVE DUTY AS OF 
FEBRUARY 2003208 


























Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 
Botswana 2 
Bouvet Island 2 
Brazil 105 
British Indian Ocean Territories 2 





Cambodia (Kampuchea) 149 
Cameroon 56 
                                            
208 Partial reproduction of table provided by Defense Manpower Data Center, Monterey, 
California.    
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Reported Country of Origin Enlistees 
Canada 283 
Canton and Enderbury Islands 1 
Cape Verde 27 
Cayman Islands 1 
Central African Republic 1 
Chad 5 
Chile 45 
China, Peoples Republic of 219 
Cocos Islands (Keeling) 4 
Colombia 624 
Comorro Island 4 
Congo 7 
Coral Sea Island 10 








Dominica and Winward Islands 84 
Dominican Republic 916 
Ecuador 396 
Egypt 34 
El Salvador 834 




Europa Island 4 









Germany, Berlin 13 
Germany, Democratic Republic 3 
Germany, Federal Republic of 108 
Ghana 275 
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Ivory Coast 32 
Jamaica 1,887 
Japan 87 




Kingman Reef 4 
Kiribati 46 
Korea, North 67 




























Navassa Island 7 
Nepal 8 
Netherlands 19 
Netherlands Antilles 12 
New Caledonia 1 




Northern Marianas 1 
Norway 5 
Pakistan 54 
Panama (Includes Canal Zone) 294 




Pitcairn Island 1 
Poland 189 
Portugal 47 
Portuguese Timor 2 





Sao Tome and Principe 1 




Reported Country of Origin Enlistees 
Seychelles 2 





South Africa 44 
South Georgia / Sandwich Island 4 
Spain 39 
Sri Lanka 9 
St. Christopher / Nevis / St. Kitts 50 
St. Lucia 83 













Trinidad and Tobago 624 
Trust Territories of the Pacific 67 
Tunisia 5 
Turkey 23 
Turks and Caicos Islands 1 
U.S. Miscellaneous Pacific Islands 6 
Uganda 15 
Ukraine 61 
United Arab Emirates 2 




Vatican City 4 
Venezuela 130 
Vietnam 371 
Vietnam, North 2 
Vietnam, South 5 
Virgin Islands 7 
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Reported Country of Origin Enlistees 
Western Sahara 11 
Western Samoa 10 
Yugoslavia 14 







APPENDIX B.  COMPARISON OF THE NATURALIZATION 
TIMELINE FOR MILITARY ENLISTEES AND CIVILIAN 
IMMIGRANTS 
The minimum time required for naturalization varies by city or region of 
residence.  Individuals who apply for citizenship must have U.S. Permanent 
Resident Status (PRS) for a minimum of five years.209  Once an individual has 
petitioned for citizenship, the time required for administrative processing of the 
application varies by processing city.  Based on estimates calculated on 
February 3, 2004, the minimum time for processing at any site is 1.5 years.  
Therefore, the minimum wait time for naturalization as of the February 2004 date 
is 6.5 years.210   
In contrast, military members who petition for citizenship are not required 
to reside in the United States for any minimum period of time.211  Under the 
provisions of Executive Order 13269,212 and pursuant to Title XVII of Public Law 
108-136 (2003), the Immigration and Naturalization Act is amended:  
To reduce from three years to one the required period of U.S. 
military service before eligibility for naturalization for U.S. 
citizenship….Such citizenship (may be) revoked for separation from 
military service under other than honorable conditions, up until the 
time the person has served honorably for an aggregate five-year 
period.213  
                                            
209 Once an individual has attained PRS, he or she must live in the United States for a 
minimum of 2.5 of the 5 years required for naturalization eligibility.  An exception applies to 
spouses of U.S. citizens.  They are required to reside in the United States a minimum of 1.5 of 3 
years before they may apply for citizenship.    
210 The current minimum wait time for spouses of U.S. citizens is 4.5 years:  3 years of 
permanent residency, plus 1.5 years for administrative processing. 
211 United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, 
http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/natz/Special.htm#other, accessed January 2004. 
212 United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, 
http://www.bcis.gov/graphics/lawsregs/handbook/ExecOrd13269.pdf, accessed September 2003. 
213 The Library of Congress, Legislative Information, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/d108/d108laws.html, accessed February 2004. 
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These provisions apply for individuals serving on active duty or as 
selected reservists.  Additionally, Section 1704 of the law provides for the 
expeditious processing of posthumous citizenship.214   
Military members who apply for citizenship may be naturalized in as little 
as three months.215  Thus, in the case of a legal immigrant who attains PRS 
(green card) upon, or shortly after his arrival in the United States, the waiting 
period for naturalization could be significantly reduced if she or he enlists in the 
armed forces.  For example, an individual who receives a green card when he 
arrives in the U.S., then immediately enlists, could hypothetically attain 
citizenship in as little as fifteen months.  This would be nearly four years before 
her or his civilian counterpart would be eligible to apply for naturalization, and 
more than five years before the civilian could attain citizenship.216    
                                            
214 Ibid. 
215 Tina Susman, “A Citizenship Struggle:  Deployed Troops Often Miss Alerts, Deadlines in 
Their Quest,” Long Island Newsday, January 30, 2004.  
216 United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, 
http://uscis.gov/graphics/formsfee/forms/files/N-400-non.pdf, accessed February 2004. 
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APPENDIX C.  OLD-TO- NEW DOD OCCUPATION CODE 
CONVERSION TABLE217 
 
                                            
217 United States Department of Defense Occupational Database Manual, DoD 1312.1-1, 













APPENDIX D.  NONCITIZEN DATA 
Table 17. Noncitizen Data for All Services 
 
N = 70,054 
RACE-ETHNICITY PERCENTAGE NUMBER 
BLACK 14.6 10,228 
LATINO 24.4 17,093 
NATAM 1.9 1,331 
API 16.2 11,349 
OTHER/UNKNOWN 42.9 30,053 
   
ETHNICITY PERCENTAGE NUMBER 
MEXICAN 10.0 7,005 
ALL OTHER LATINO 12.9 9,037 
NATIVE AMERICAN 1.9 1,331 
FILIPINO 7.6 5,324 
PACIFIC ISLANDER 1.2 841 
ALL OTHER ASIAN 7.3 5,114 
OTHER 60.3 42,243 









Table 18. Noncitizen Data for the Army 
 
N = 6,383 
RACE-ETHNICITY PERCENTAGE NUMBER 
BLACK 18.8 1,200 
LATINO 21.5 1,372 
NATAM 1.0 64 
API 12.0 766 
OTHER/UNKNOWN 46.7 2,981 
   
ETHNICITY PERCENTAGE NUMBER 
MEXICAN 8.7 555 
ALL OTHER LATINO 12.9 823 
NATIVE AMERICAN 1.0 64 
FILIPINO 3.8 243 
PACIFIC ISLANDER 2.1 134 
ALL OTHER ASIAN 5.7 364 
OTHER 65.7 4,194 
UNKNOWN 0.2 13 
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Table 19. Noncitizen Data for the Navy 
 
N = 9,729 
RACE-ETHNICITY PERCENTAGE NUMBER 
BLACK 14.3 1,391 
LATINO 21.7 2,111 
NATAM 3.3 321 
API 21.0 2,043 
OTHER/UNKNOWN 39.7 3,862 
   
ETHNICITY PERCENTAGE NUMBER 
MEXICAN 8.6 837 
ALL OTHER LATINO 13.2 1,284 
NATIVE AMERICAN 3.3 321 
FILIPINO 13.2 1,284 
PACIFIC ISLANDER 1.1 107 
ALL OTHER ASIAN 5.7 555 
OTHER 54.6 5,312 
UNKNOWN 0.3 29 
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Table 20.  Noncitizen Data for the Air Force 
 
N = 3,435 
RACE-ETHNICITY PERCENTAGE NUMBER 
BLACK 13.1 450 
LATINO 14.2 488 
NATAM 0.8 27 
API 14.5 498 
OTHER/UNKNOWN 57.4 1,972 
   
ETHNICITY PERCENTAGE NUMBER 
MEXICAN 5.6 192 
ALL OTHER LATINO 8.6 295 
NATIVE AMERICAN 0.7 24 
FILIPINO 7.9 271 
PACIFIC ISLANDER 0.8 27 
ALL OTHER ASIAN 4.8 165 
OTHER 71.0 2,439 
UNKNOWN 0.4 14 
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Table 21.  Noncitizen Data for the Marine Corps 
 
N = 3,838 
RACE-ETHNICITY PERCENTAGE NUMBER 
BLACK 12.0 461 
LATINO 34.6 1,328 
NATAM 1.8 69 
API 9.4 361 
OTHER/UNKNOWN 42.2 1,620 
   
ETHNICITY PERCENTAGE NUMBER 
MEXICAN 18.6 714 
ALL OTHER LATINO 16.0 614 
NATIVE AMERICAN 1.8 69 
FILIPINO 3.1 119 
PACIFIC ISLANDER 0.6 23 
ALL OTHER ASIAN 5.0 192 
OTHER 54.6 2,096 
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APPENDIX E.  ANALYSIS OF MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD 
ESTIMATES FOR ATTRITION MODELS 
Table 22. Logit Regression Results for Army Attrition Model 
 
Parameter DF Standard Estimate Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept 1 -0.6656 0.0450 219.0676 <.0001 
NONCITIZEN 1 -0.5649 0.0303 346.5291 <.0001 
AFQTPERC 1 -0.00785 0.000272 836.0534 <.0001 
FEMALE 1 0.5996 0.0113 2821.3852 <.0001 
SOMCOLL 1 -0.2281 0.0458 24.8070 <.0001 
COLLGRAD 1 -0.4186 0.0293 204.5911 <.0001 
ALTGRAD 1 0.6874 0.0202 1162.6848 <.0001 
BLACK 1 -0.3369 0.0117 827.9596 <.0001 
LATINO 1 -0.3795 0.0195 380.5145 <.0001 
NATAM 1 0.0137 0.0530 0.0670 0.7958 
API 1 -0.5600 0.0366 234.2910 <.0001 
UNKNRACE 1 -0.3408 0.0517 43.4003 <.0001 
MARRIED 1 -0.7998 0.0130 3802.8888 <.0001 
DEPENDENT 1 -0.2867 0.00645 1977.4781 <.0001 
MORWAIVER 1 0.1430 0.0157 83.3636 <.0001 
AGE 1 0.0725 0.00205 1250.8236 <.0001 
MONDEP 1 -0.0371 0.00152 591.7880 <.0001 
 
N=205,905 









Table 23. Logit Regression Results for Navy Attrition Model 
 
Parameter DF StandardEstimate Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept 1 -0.1836 0.0378 23.6416 <.0001 
NONCITIZEN 1 -0.6838 0.0254 727.5603 <.0001 
AFQTPERC 1 -0.00896 0.000201 1989.7546 <.0001 
FEMALE 1 0.2336 0.0102 523.6605 <.0001 
SOMCOLL 1 -0.3831 0.0468 66.8902 <.0001 
COLLGRAD 1 -0.2932 0.0356 67.8889 <.0001 
ALTGRAD 1 0.6764 0.0142 2268.3555 <.0001 
BLACK 1 -0.1096 0.0103 114.2442 <.0001 
LATINO 1 -0.1641 0.0133 152.2637 <.0001 
NATAM 1 0.0425 0.0348 1.4949 0.2215 
API 1 -0.6387 0.0254 632.1705 <.0001 
UNKNRACE 1 -0.1603 0.0592 7.3289 0.0068 
MARRIED 1 -0.5771 0.0122 2253.2674 <.0001 
DEPENDENT 1 -0.5438 0.00670 6584.8187 <.0001 
MORWAIVER 1 0.2875 0.00810 1259.7997 <.0001 
AGE 1 0.0431 0.00175 603.7772 <.0001 
MONDEP 1 -0.0471 0.00106 1971.4056 <.0001 
 
N=294,808 




Table 24.  Logit Regression Results for Air Force Attrition Model 
 
Parameter DF Standard Estimate Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept 1 0.2764 0.0530 27.1919 <.0001 
NONCITIZEN 1 -0.4217 0.0406 107.7746 <.0001 
AFQTPERC 1 -0.0126 0.000289 1909.0405 <.0001 
FEMALE 1 0.1990 0.0106 353.6567 <.0001 
SOMCOLL 1 -0.2120 0.0573 13.6715 0.0002 
COLLGRAD 1 0.2191 0.0352 38.7061 <.0001 
ALTGRAD 1 0.4561 0.0385 140.3006 <.0001 
BLACK 1 -0.2609 0.0135 372.8548 <.0001 
LATINO 1 -0.4082 0.0227 324.3697 <.0001 
NATAM 1 0.2440 0.0624 15.3158 <.0001 
API 1 -0.5518 0.0342 260.7541 <.0001 
UNKNRACE 1 -0.3355 0.0451 55.3277 <.0001 
MARRIED 1 -0.3065 0.0132 541.3061 <.0001 
DEPENDENT 1 -0.7391 0.00793 8685.8764 <.0001 
MORWAIVER 1 0.1395 0.0135 107.3102 <.0001 
AGE 1 0.0295 0.00252 137.2985 <.0001 
MONDEP 1 0.2764 0.0530 27.1919 <.0001 
 
N=202,064 




Table 25. Logit Regression Results for Marine Corps Attrition Model 
 
Parameter DF Standard Estimate Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept 1 -1.1096 0.0628 312.5509 <.0001 
NONCITIZEN 1 -0.5122 0.0301 289.0297 <.0001 
AFQTPERC 1 -0.0111 0.000291 1460.6107 <.0001 
FEMALE 1 0.7315 0.0199 1354.2693 <.0001 
SOMCOLL 1 -0.2605 0.0945 7.5956 0.0059 
COLLGRAD 1 -0.6115 0.0684 79.8864 <.0001 
ALTGRAD 1 0.6400 0.0211 921.7491 <.0001 
BLACK 1 0.0272 0.0143 3.6199 0.0571 
LATINO 1 -0.3471 0.0178 380.2552 <.0001 
NATAM 1 0.00596 0.0454 0.0173 0.8955 
API 1 -0.4516 0.0422 114.5321 <.0001 
UNKNRACE 1 -0.1880 0.0492 14.5968 0.0001 
MARRIED 1 -0.9304 0.0173 2879.4008 <.0001 
DEPENDENT 1 -0.4899 0.00937 2732.6065 <.0001 
MORWAIVER 1 0.2235 0.00994 504.9356 <.0001 
AGE 1 0.0908 0.00302 904.8827 <.0001 
MONDEP 1 -0.0439 0.00133 1092.0356 <.0001 
 
N=191,924 




APPENDIX F.  ANALYSIS OF MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD 
ESTIMATES FOR RETENTION MODELS 
Table 26. Logit Regression Results for Army Retention Model 
Parameter DF Standard Estimate Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept 1 -0.4212 0.0637 43.7443 <.0001 
NONCITIZEN 1 0.3341 0.0326 104.9146 <.0001 
AFQTPERC 1 0.00350 0.000344 103.4964 <.0001 
FEMALE 1 -0.3731 0.0152 602.3474 <.0001 
SOMCOLL 1 0.0152 0.0559 0.0742 0.7854 
COLLGRAD 1 0.0473 0.0358 1.7427 0.1868 
ALTGRAD 1 -0.4576 0.0249 337.0854 <.0001 
BLACK 1 0.4049 0.0142 809.4051 <.0001 
LATINO 1 0.1917 0.0226 72.1069 <.0001 
NATAM 1 0.0401 0.0677 0.3501 0.5540 
API 1 0.3741 0.0413 82.2337 <.0001 
UNKNRACE 1 0.3013 0.0583 26.6730 <.0001 
AGE 1 -0.0711 0.00253 792.2603 <.0001 
MONDEP 1 0.0328 0.00183 320.1829 <.0001 
UNEMP 1 0.0738 0.00496 221.1955 <.0001 
MARRIED 1 0.9455 0.0148 4093.4705 <.0001 
DEPENDENT 1 0.4473 0.00706 4013.5198 <.0001 
MORWAIVER 1 -0.0777 0.0196 15.7055 <.0001 
MOS10 1 -0.2813 0.0186 228.0074 <.0001 
MOS11 1 -0.2556 0.0229 125.0847 <.0001 
MOS12 1 -0.3277 0.0209 245.2156 <.0001 
MOS13 1 -0.1977 0.0229 74.4144 <.0001 
MOS14 1 0.0446 0.0364 1.5014 0.2205 
MOS16 1 -0.4059 0.0224 329.2117 <.0001 
MOS17 1 -0.4862 0.0420 134.2976 <.0001 
MOS18 1 -0.2242 0.0246 83.0070 <.0001 
MOS19 1 -3.2248 0.0720 2007.1066 <.0001 
 
N=205,905 
R2= 0.1822, -2 Log L = 226320.82 
P=<0.0001 
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Table 27. Logit Regression Results for Navy Retention Model 
 
Parameter DF Standard Estimate Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept 1 -0.9528 0.0535 317.2568 <.0001 
NONCITIZEN 1 0.3994 0.0271 217.6117 <.0001 
AFQTPERC 1 0.0141 0.000259 2979.1732 <.0001 
FEMALE 1 -0.0801 0.0130 37.7941 <.0001 
SOMCOLL 1 -0.00637 0.0514 0.0154 0.9013 
COLLGRAD 1 -0.2218 0.0399 30.8578 <.0001 
ALTGRAD 1 -0.3291 0.0187 309.9098 <.0001 
BLACK 1 0.3745 0.0129 848.8202 <.0001 
LATINO 1 0.0964 0.0162 35.3267 <.0001 
NATAM 1 0.1423 0.0426 11.1819 0.0008 
API 1 0.5964 0.0275 470.2358 <.0001 
UNKNRACE 1 0.3506 0.0692 25.6782 <.0001 
AGE 1 -0.0139 0.00217 41.1394 <.0001 
MONDEP 1 0.0236 0.00134 309.4998 <.0001 
UNEMP 1 0.000889 0.00394 0.0510 0.8214 
MARRIED 1 0.2168 0.0137 251.9610 <.0001 
DEPENDENT 1 0.5259 0.00694 5743.9251 <.0001 
MORWAIVER 1 -0.1251 0.0101 151.9461 <.0001 
MOS10 1 -0.9133 0.0215 1805.1387 <.0001 
MOS11 1 0.0644 0.0187 11.8678 0.0006 
MOS12 1 -0.2981 0.0198 227.6336 <.0001 
MOS13 1 0.6667 0.0221 908.4047 <.0001 
MOS14 1 0.4008 0.0487 67.7144 <.0001 
MOS16 1 -0.2673 0.0170 247.3563 <.0001 
MOS17 1 -0.0779 0.0226 11.8416 0.0006 
MOS18 1 -0.2963 0.0252 137.7301 <.0001 
MOS19 1 -3.7313 0.0341 11988.1393 <.0001 
 
N=294,808 






Table 28. Logit Regression Results for Air Force Retention Model 
 
Parameter DF Standard Estimate Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept 1 -0.2589 0.0680 14.4768 0.0001 
NONCITIZEN 1 -0.0305 0.0414 0.5431 0.4611 
AFQTPERC 1 -0.00036 0.000365 0.9980 0.3178 
FEMALE 1 0.0608 0.0139 19.2631 <.0001 
SOMCOLL 1 0.1069 0.0637 2.8130 0.0935 
COLLGRAD 1 -0.1486 0.0445 11.1575 0.0008 
ALTGRAD 1 -0.1072 0.0481 4.9625 0.0259 
BLACK 1 0.3273 0.0157 436.5583 <.0001 
LATINO 1 0.0636 0.0241 6.9491 0.0084 
NATAM 1 -0.1091 0.0755 2.0867 0.1486 
API 1 0.3390 0.0352 92.9828 <.0001 
UNKNRACE 1 0.2868 0.0489 34.3969 <.0001 
AGE 1 -0.0281 0.00295 90.5259 <.0001 
MONDEP 1 0.0224 0.00174 165.2429 <.0001 
UNEMP 1 0.1036 0.00477 470.8292 <.0001 
MARRIED 1 -0.1259 0.0148 71.8732 <.0001 
DEPENDENT 1 0.8222 0.00809 10321.7038 <.0001 
MORWAIVER 1 -0.0196 0.0168 1.3511 0.2451 
MOS10 1 -0.2736 0.0208 173.7672 <.0001 
MOS11 1 -0.2167 0.0225 92.4791 <.0001 
MOS12 1 0.0811 0.0241 11.3535 0.0008 
MOS13 1 -0.2748 0.0209 172.5193 <.0001 
MOS14 1 -0.3858 0.0279 191.1953 <.0001 
MOS16 1 -0.2935 0.0173 287.2559 <.0001 
MOS17 1 -0.4966 0.0266 347.7796 <.0001 
MOS18 1 -0.6394 0.0228 787.3776 <.0001 
MOS19 1 -3.7656 0.0404 8699.3717 <.0001 
 
N=202,064 





Table 29. Logit Regression Results for Marine Corps Retention Model 
 
Parameter DF Standard Estimate Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept 1 -0.8682 0.0837 107.5731 <.0001 
NONCITIZEN 1 0.2807 0.0303 85.5516 <.0001 
AFQTPERC 1 0.00228 0.000371 37.7126 <.0001 
FEMALE 1 -0.1355 0.0258 27.6633 <.0001 
SOMCOLL 1 0.0122 0.1103 0.0123 0.9117 
COLLGRAD 1 -0.2183 0.0843 6.7099 0.0096 
ALTGRAD 1 -0.0277 0.0273 1.0311 0.3099 
BLACK 1 0.3697 0.0172 459.2652 <.0001 
LATINO 1 0.1265 0.0196 41.4998 <.0001 
NATAM 1 0.0832 0.0578 2.0715 0.1501 
API 1 0.3080 0.0455 45.7242 <.0001 
UNKNRACE 1 0.2474 0.0563 19.3311 <.0001 
AGE 1 -0.0284 0.00372 58.3129 <.0001 
MONDEP 1 0.0166 0.00164 102.5123 <.0001 
UNEMP 1 0.0473 0.00531 79.3972 <.0001 
MARRIED 1 0.2801 0.0172 264.0860 <.0001 
DEPENDENT 1 0.4177 0.00740 3185.2846 <.0001 
MORWAIVER 1 -0.3092 0.0127 589.4596 <.0001 
MOS10 1 -0.4548 0.0189 579.9281 <.0001 
MOS11 1 0.6820 0.0395 298.6096 <.0001 
MOS12 1 -0.0740 0.0259 8.1426 0.0043 
MOS13 1 3.4859 0.3650 91.2016 <.0001 
MOS14 1 0.1170 0.0399 8.5930 0.0034 
MOS16 1 -0.1010 0.0220 21.1112 <.0001 
MOS17 1 -0.4236 0.0369 132.0209 <.0001 
MOS18 1 -0.4425 0.0212 434.7215 <.0001 
MOS19 1 -2.4957 0.0349 5099.8254 <.0001 
 
N=191,924 




APPENDIX G.  ANALYSIS OF MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD 
ESTIMATES FOR RESTRICTED PROMOTION MODELS 
Table 30. Logit Regression Results for Restricted Army Promotion Model 
 
Parameter DF StandardEstimate Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept 1 1.3905 0.1518 83.9482 <.0001 
NONCITIZEN 1 0.5665 0.1116 25.7553 <.0001 
AFQTPERC 1 0.00904 0.00103 77.4421 <.0001 
FEMALE 1 -0.1889 0.0396 22.7992 <.0001 
SOMCOLL 1 0.1821 0.1619 1.2651 0.2607 
COLLGRAD 1 2.5822 0.2720 90.1075 <.0001 
ALTGRAD 1 -0.7893 0.0625 159.6424 <.0001 
BLACK 1 0.1581 0.0416 14.4595 0.0001 
LATINO 1 0.3139 0.0677 21.4713 <.0001 
NATAM 1 -0.2262 0.1727 1.7151 0.1903 
API 1 0.6103 0.1399 19.0426 <.0001 
UNKNRACE 1 0.2708 0.1651 2.6902 0.1010 
MARRIED 1 0.9033 0.0455 393.9023 <.0001 
DEPENDENT 1 0.1277 0.0239 28.5697 <.0001 
MORWAIVER 1 -0.0814 0.0603 1.8245 0.1768 
AGE 1 -0.00959 0.00714 1.8078 0.1788 
 
N=44,715 




Table 31.  Logit Regression Results for Restricted Navy Promotion Model 
 
Parameter DF StandardEstimate Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept 1 0.4659 0.1237 14.1841 0.0002 
NONCITIZEN 1 0.3468 0.0651 28.4025 <.0001 
AFQTPERC 1 0.0229 0.000730 983.1019 <.0001 
FEMALE 1 -0.1202 0.0338 12.6564 0.0004 
SOMCOLL 1 0.6433 0.2087 9.5024 0.0021 
COLLGRAD 1 0.5390 0.1676 10.3431 0.0013 
ALTGRAD 1 -0.6291 0.0431 213.2909 <.0001 
BLACK 1 -0.2932 0.0312 88.1845 <.0001 
LATINO 1 0.0283 0.0435 0.4230 0.5154 
NATAM 1 -0.1341 0.0919 2.1327 0.1442 
API 1 0.3363 0.0731 21.1657 <.0001 
UNKNRACE 1 0.0118 0.1450 0.0066 0.9351 
MARRIED 1 0.3829 0.0428 80.1400 <.0001 
DEPENDENT 1 0.1970 0.0220 79.8400 <.0001 
MORWAIVER 1 -0.2807 0.0274 105.0035 <.0001 
AGE 1 0.0108 0.00596 3.3155 0.0686 
 
N=65,957 





Table 32. Logit Regression Results for Restricted Air Force Promotion Model 
 
Parameter DF StandardEstimate Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept 1 0.4943 0.2299 4.6250 0.0315 
NONCITIZEN 1 0.4961 0.1759 7.9508 0.0048 
AFQTPERC 1 0.00870 0.00127 46.7072 <.0001 
FEMALE 1 0.3130 0.0478 42.8291 <.0001 
SOMCOLL 1 0.1677 0.2573 0.4248 0.5146 
COLLGRAD 1 0.8555 0.2851 9.0041 0.0027 
ALTGRAD 1 0.00695 0.1889 0.0014 0.9707 
BLACK 1 -0.2867 0.0498 33.2118 <.0001 
1 -0.1307 0.0771 2.8740 0.0900 
NATAM 1 -0.4205 0.2403 3.0620 0.0801 
API 1 0.2936 0.1375 4.5565 0.0328 
UNKNRACE 1 0.1763 0.1666 1.1199 0.2899 
MARRIED 1 0.00632 0.0574 0.0121 0.9123 
DEPENDENT 1 0.3149 0.0316 99.6074 <.0001 
MORWAIVER 1 -0.1006 0.0604 2.7765 0.0957 
AGE 1 0.0829 0.0116 51.3387 <.0001 
 
N=56,717 














Table 33. Logit Regression Results for Restricted Marine Corps Promotion Model 
 
Parameter DF Standard Estimate Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept 1 0.1681 0.1320 1.6208 0.2030 
NONCITIZEN 1 0.4783 0.0641 55.6915 <.0001 
AFQTPERC 1 0.0128 0.000678 357.1389 <.0001 
FEMALE 1 0.1594 0.0500 10.1796 0.0014 
SOMCOLL 1 0.6413 0.2926 4.8034 0.0284 
COLLGRAD 1 -0.4394 0.1361 10.4189 0.0012 
ALTGRAD 1 -0.4643 0.0512 82.3331 <.0001 
BLACK 1 -0.1995 0.0329 36.7887 <.0001 
LATINO 1 0.0310 0.0365 0.7200 0.3961 
NATAM 1 -0.2337 0.1143 4.1826 0.0408 
API 1 0.1643 0.0954 2.9650 0.0851 
UNKNRACE 1 -0.0460 0.0951 0.2333 0.6291 
MARRIED 1 -0.0429 0.0341 1.5786 0.2090 
DEPENDENT 1 0.1261 0.0162 60.4103 <.0001 
MORWAIVER 1 -0.2975 0.0265 126.0589 <.0001 
AGE 1 0.0258 0.00660 15.2431 <.0001 
 
N=48,023 













APPENDIX H.  ANALYSIS OF MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD 
ESTIMATES FOR UNRESTRICTED PROMOTION MODELS 
The results of the unrestricted promotion models for all services are 
shown in Tables G1 – G4.  This sample includes all individuals, regardless of 
attrition status.  Negative coefficients indicate a lower predicted probability of 
promotion, while positive coefficients indicate a higher predicted probability of 
promotion.   
Noncitizens have a significantly higher estimated probability of promotion 
to E-4 in all four services.  Their predicted promotion rates range from 16 
percentage points higher (Army) to 13.5 percentage points higher (Air Force) 
than citizens.  Other variables that have a positive effect on the predicted 
promotion rate are:  higher AFQT percentile, some college, college graduate, 
male gender, Latino, API, married, and dependents.    
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Table 34. Logit Regression Results for Unrestricted Army Promotion Model 
 





Intercept 1 0.4200 0.0688 37.2205 <.0001 -------- 
NONCITIZEN 1 0.6475 0.0495 171.1696 <.0001 0.160 
AFQTPERC 1 0.00921 0.000476 373.7028 <.0001 0.023 
FEMALE 1 -0.4607 0.0173 712.6943 <.0001 -0.110 
SOMCOLL 1 0.4147 0.0704 34.6871 <.0001 0.103 
COLLGRAD 1 3.0241 0.0865 1221.8789 <.0001 0.495 
ALTGRAD 1 -0.8329 0.0315 697.0403 <.0001 -0.187 
BLACK 1 0.3328 0.0194 293.7562 <.0001 -0.082 
LATINO 1 0.3654 0.0307 141.6621 <.0001 0.091 
NATAM 1 -0.0323 0.0877 0.1355 0.7128 -0.008 
API 1 0.6020 0.0599 101.1363 <.0001 0.150 
UNKNRACE 1 0.3616 0.0748 23.3995 <.0001 0.090 
MARRIED 1 1.2228 0.0215 3244.7409 <.0001 0.285 
DEPENDENT 1 0.1089 0.0111 96.7388 <.0001 0.027 
MORWAIVER 1 -0.1413 0.0274 26.5350 <.0001 -0.034 
AGE 1 -0.0600 0.00320 350.7270 <.0001 -0.015 
 
N=112,287 




Table 35. Logit Regression Results for Unrestricted Navy Promotion Model 
 







Intercept 1 0.0698 0.0646 1.1681 0.2798 ------- 
NONCITIZEN 1 0.6657 0.0398 280.4214 <.0001 0.152 
AFQTPERC 1 0.0184 0.000382 2314.9517 <.0001 0.045 
FEMALE 1 -0.1620 0.0185 76.5757 <.0001 -0.040 
SOMCOLL 1 0.5772 0.0900 41.0855 <.0001 0.134 
COLLGRAD 1 0.7467 0.0712 109.8516 <.0001 0.170 
ALTGRAD 1 -0.8146 0.0244 1118.1302 <.0001 -0.200 
BLACK 1 -0.0227 0.0181 1.5758 0.2094 -0.005 
LATINO 1 0.2135 0.0244 76.4288 <.0001 0.052 
NATAM 1 -0.1805 0.0480 14.1516 0.0002 -0.045 
API 1 0.5716 0.0402 202.0131 <.0001 0.132 
UNKNRACE 1 0.0663 0.0791 0.7020 0.4021 0.016 
MARRIED 1 0.7918 0.0252 984.8056 <.0001 0.177 
DEPENDENT 1 0.3948 0.0139 802.1487 <.0001 0.093 
MORWAIVER 1 -0.4231 0.0146 836.1713 <.0001 -0.105 
AGE 1 -0.0487 0.00308 249.3215 <.0001 -0.012 
 
N=120,516 










Table 36. Logit Regression Results for Unrestricted Air Force Promotion Model 
 







Intercept 1 -0.4170 0.0896 21.6711 <.0001 ------- 
NONCITIZEN 1 0.5977 0.0733 66.5004 <.0001 0.135 
AFQTPERC 1 0.0112 0.000506 493.2495 <.0001 0.027 
FEMALE 1 -0.1357 0.0183 55.2275 <.0001 -0.033 
SOMCOLL 1 0.2926 0.1012 8.3600 0.0038 0.070 
COLLGRAD 1 1.0211 0.0733 194.2336 <.0001 0.214 
ALTGRAD 1 -0.3972 0.0678 34.3312 <.0001 -0.100 
BLACK 1 0.00196 0.0219 0.0080 0.9289 0.000 
LATINO 1 0.2274 0.0359 40.1807 <.0001 0.054 
NATAM 1 -0.4359 0.1034 17.7839 <.0001 -0.108 
API 1 0.5009 0.0564 78.8016 <.0001 0.115 
UNKNRACE 1 0.3050 0.0685 19.8303 <.0001 0.072 
MARRIED 1 0.3394 0.0254 178.0632 <.0001 0.080 
DEPENDENT 1 0.7009 0.0163 1849.2226 <.0001 0.156 
MORWAIVER 1 -0.2322 0.0251 85.2958 <.0001 -0.057 
AGE 1 -0.4170 0.0896 21.6711 <.0001 0.000 
 
N=91,510 






Table 37. Logit Regression Results for Unrestricted Marine Corps Promotion Model 
 






1 0.2749 0.0862 10.1679 0.0014 ------- 
NONCITIZEN 1 0.6078 0.0451 181.9755 <.0001 0.150 
AFQTPERC 1 0.0137 0.000460 891.0088 <.0001 0.034 
FEMALE 1 -0.2957 0.0304 94.6386 <.0001 -0.070 
SOMCOLL 1 0.3796 0.1472 6.6528 0.0099 0.100 
COLLGRAD 1 0.4973 0.1051 22.3843 <.0001 0.123 
ALTGRAD 1 -0.7151 0.0358 399.1959 <.0001 -0.160 
1 -0.0759 0.0235 10.4395 0.0012 -0.020 
LATINO 1 0.2467 0.0268 84.9287 <.0001 0.061 
NATAM 1 -0.2453 0.0801 9.3702 0.0022 -0.060 
API 1 0.3777 0.0648 33.9744 <.0001 0.093 
UNKNRACE 1 0.2521 0.0691 13.3054 0.0003 0.062 
1 0.8410 0.0254 1096.4424 <.0001 0.206 
0.3051 0.0129 558.6526 <.0001 0.075 
MORWAIVER 1 -0.3602 0.0186 373.8226 <.0001 -0.085 
AGE 1 -0.0700 0.00426 270.2981 <.0001 -0.017 
  
N=98,529 
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